Changing work and employment relations in German industries - breaking away from the German model? by Jürgens, Ulrich et al.
www.ssoar.info
Changing work and employment relations in
German industries - breaking away from the
German model?
Jürgens, Ulrich; Krzywdzinski, Martin; Teipen, Christina
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Arbeitspapier / working paper
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
SSG Sozialwissenschaften, USB Köln
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Jürgens, U., Krzywdzinski, M., & Teipen, C. (2006). Changing work and employment relations in German industries
- breaking away from the German model? (Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung,
Forschungsschwerpunkt Organisationen und Wissen, Forschungsgruppe Wissen, Produktionssysteme und
Arbeit, 2006-302). Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH. https://nbn-resolving.org/
urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-114090
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
       WZB – discussion paper 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ulrich Jürgens, Martin Krzywdzinski,  
Christina Teipen 
 
Changing Work and Employment Relations  
in German Industries – 
Breaking Away from the German Model? 
 
 
 
SP III 2006-302 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
juergens@wz-berlin.de 
krzywdzinski@wz-berlin.de 
teipen@wz-berlin.de 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ZITIERWEISE/CITATION: 
 
 
Ulrich Jürgens, Martin Krzywdzinski, Christina Teipen 
 
Changing Work and Emplyoment Relations in German Industries – Breaking Away from the 
German Model? 
Discussion Paper SP III 2006-302 
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (2006) 
 
 
 
Schwerpunkt:     Research Area: 
Organisationen und    Organizations and  
Wissen      Knowledge 
 
 
 
Forschungsgruppe:    Research Group: 
Wissen, Produktionssysteme   Knowledge, Production Systems 
und Arbeit     and Work 
 
 
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH (WZB) 
Reichpietschufer 50, D-10785 Berlin 
Telefon: +49 30 25491-272, Fax: +49 30 25491-255 
www.wz-berlin.de/ow/wpa 
 
 
 
  
Abstract 
In this paper, we examine employment relationships as an important dimension 
of the „German model“. There is a long tradition of debate regarding a specific 
“German model” comprised of institutions and practices in this area, including 
the partnership of labour and capital symbolised by the system of co-determi-
nation; patterns of long-term employment for many employees, an emphasis on 
skills and correspondingly high investments in vocational training, competition 
based on quality production, often targeting upper market segments. Is this 
model changing? Do we even witness a break of this model? 
We analyse processes at the micro and meso level. We suppose that the 
reorganisation of industry structure and of value chains, and the transformation 
of business models of enterprises are important drivers of changing employ-
ment relationships. We have chosen three industries for our analysis that allow 
a “most different cases” comparison: The automotive industry, the telecommu-
nications equipment industry, and the video games industry. First, the automo-
tive industry is a successful and highly competitive case of industrial develop-
ment in Germany and represents best the “classical” German model of em-
ployment relationships. The telecom equipment industry and the video games 
industry are parts of the large complex of so called infocom industries represen-
tative of the “New Economy”. It is often claimed that the development of these 
industries is not compatible with the framework for employment relations char-
acterizing countries like Germany. Is this assertion true?  
We find similar trends but differences in patterns and pace of change in the 
automobile and in the telecommunications equipment industries. In both indus-
tries, the binding force of industry-wide agreements declines. In both industries, 
the employees have to accept wage reductions and increasing flexibility to 
maintain their employment security. In both industries, the outsourcing and off-
shoring pressures are very strong and entail deep changes in the balance of 
power between actors. The video games industry stands apart because the in-
stitutions of the German model have very limited applicability to this industry.  
But do the changes represent a break with the “German model”? It seems 
that in the current situation, two scenarios of development are still possible: A 
gradual adaptation to new conditions and a radical break from the hitherto tra-
jectory. 
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Preface 
This discussion paper is part of research conducted in the European research net-
work on “European Socio-Economic Models of a Knowledge-Based Society” 
(ESEMK). This project addresses two main questions: Which socio-economic models 
exist in Europe and which trends emerge in European countries on their way to 
knowledge-based societies? How do socio-economic models develop in interaction 
between institutions at the macro level and companies at the micro level? 
In this context, the WZB team is examining work and employment models at the 
company and industry level. We are concentrating on the following three change dy-
namics:  
1. The orientation of European societies with regard to the Anglo-American model. 
Convergence towards this model could lead to stronger market-type regulation in 
personnel policy and the individualization of income and employment risks. Is a 
contrasting, independent socio-economic model of development discernible in 
Europe?  
2. The trend towards production and innovation networks. How do these flexible 
forms of cross-company coordination affect work and employment systems?  
3. The transnationalisation of production. Companies can shift production between 
countries to locations where they find favourable institutional conditions. What 
are the repercussions for work and employment systems both at home and 
abroad? 
The research consists of company case studies and the analysis of industry devel-
opments. We examine change dynamics in the automotive industry, the telecommu-
nications equipment industry and the software industry (video games). We are con-
centrating initially on Sweden, Germany, and Poland. Germany and Sweden repre-
sent two so called “high-road” economic and social models that have experienced 
strong pressure for change during the last ten or fifteen years. Poland is a low-wage 
country and a very attractive host economy for foreign investment from Western 
Europe, which in turn exerts strong competitive pressure on labour regulation and 
work and employment models more generally in its western and northern neighbour 
countries. The interactions between work and employment models in these three in-
dustries play an important role in our research. 
The ESEMK research network includes four main research areas and 12 partici-
pants: macro-analysis of socio-economic models in Europe (CEPREMAP, GERPISA, 
GRES, MPIfG, University Bielefeld, University Padova), financialisation and its impact 
on industrial firms (University Manchester, INSEAD, CEPREMAP), work and em-
ployment relationships (Science Center Berlin [WZB], University Bristol), product pol-
icy and productive organisation (GRES, University Bordeaux, University Toulouse, 
University Padova). It is financed through the 6th Framework Programme of the EU 
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(Priority 7: Citizens and Governance in a Knowledge Based Society), and the project 
period extends from 2004 to 2006. 
 
The project team at WZB is:  
 
Ulrich Jürgens (project leader); juergens@wz-berlin.de,  
Martin Krzywdzinski; krzywdzinski@wz-berlin.de, 
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1. Introduction 
Against the background of an economic recession beginning in 2003, the debate re-
garding Germany’s socio-economic model and its basic institutions has revived, and 
demands for fundamental reforms have become increased. Indeed, critics of the 
German model insist that a radical break with established institutions is needed. The 
lack of a fundamental reform program along the lines of what Thatcher implemented 
in Great Britain is blamed for sluggish growth and high unemployment rates. On the 
macro level, fundamental reform of the welfare system and of labour regulation is 
advocated. In 2005, the electorate seemed ready for such radical reforms and the 
elections of 2005 were expected to signal a sea change for “Model Germany”.  
Also on the micro- and meso-level critical voices have become louder and louder 
during this period. Executive managers of leading companies publicly question the 
future viability of their operations in Germany, while reports of Germany’s non-
competitive cost levels are juxtaposed with testimonials about the advantages of re-
locating to Eastern Europe or China. The CEO of Opel puts it succinctly: “Out of 
Germany or out of business!” (Forster 2004). Yet beyond the dire assessments of 
Germany’s future offered by advocates of reform, a more complex and differentiated 
picture emerges across companies and industries, with diverse evaluations reflecting 
a variety of firm and sector level characteristics. In fact, conversations with a wider 
range of business leaders and managers will even yield surprisingly positive evalua-
tions of the German situation. 
In this paper, we focus on changing employment relationships as an important 
dimension of the „Modell Deutschland“. There is a long tradition of debate regarding 
a specific “German model” comprised of institutions and practices in this area, includ-
ing the partnership of labour and capital symbolised by the system of co-
determination; patterns of long-term employment for many employees, an emphasis 
on skills and correspondingly high investments in vocational training, competition 
based on quality production, often targeting upper market segments. Is this model 
changing? And if so, how is this change best characterized: A gradual adaptation to 
new conditions or a radical break from the current trajectory? 
The background of this paper is a European-wide project on “European socio-
economic models of a knowledge-based society” (cf. the preface to this paper). In the 
context of the ESEMK project, we examine employment relationships at the company 
and plant level and their interaction with national institutions of labour regulation. The 
term “labour regulation,” as we use it, refers to policies, rules, customs and practices 
which influence actors when they develop solutions to issues and/or problems re-
garding employment relations.1 These can range from norms, which orient employers 
                                            
1  Labour regulation refers to what regulation theory calls the “wage-labour nexus”. Boyer 
and Saillard (2002) define the wage-labour nexus as the “institutions framing the em-
ployment contract” and the “set of legal and institutional conditions that govern the use 
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to what is socially acceptable or common, to laws, which oblige them to act in a cer-
tain way when managing the tension between job security and labour flexibility; or 
between organization-centred incentives which foster social cohesion and individual-
centred incentives to promote ambition and motivation. We distinguish the following 
aspects of company and sectoral employment relationships in order to organise the 
empirical research and evidence:  
– employment and status protection,  
– flexibility (numerical flexibility, time flexibility, functional flexibility, mobility),  
– competence and skill development (qualification, personnel development),  
– performance regulation (incentive and control systems), and 
– equality and inequality of working and employment conditions within and be-
tween enterprises. 
We are analysing processes at the micro and meso level. We suppose that the reor-
ganisation of industry structure and of value chains, and the transformation of busi-
ness models of enterprises are important drivers of changing employment relation-
ships. We are not primarily concerned with the views of managers regarding the gen-
eral debate about the German model; rather, our question is to what extent corporate 
and industry actors, in responding to the changing environment and the new chal-
lenges and opportunities it presents, have introduced changes – incrementally or 
radically – or rather continued on established paths. If we see an intensification of 
changes, are they basically following the established trajectories or are there indica-
tions of new directions which suggest a departure from the existing model of em-
ployment relations? In our view a break with the “German model” would be the cumu-
lative result of significant changes on four dimensions, which we outline below: 
– The withdrawal from or abandonment of the negotiation arenas of social partner-
ship (e.g. the collective bargaining system or the works councils) and a move to-
wards individualised bargaining and incentive models, i.e. an institutional break; 
– The abandonment of the idea of the recognition and balance of all interests in the 
enterprise (e.g. through the domination of the shareholder value concept), i.e. a 
break in the governance logic; 
– The decline of solidarity and the increase of inequality within and among enter-
prises, i.e. an important change in the distribution of security, risk and wealth; i.e. 
a break with previous value orientations; 
– Determined steps to relocate activities outside Germany i.e. to take the exit op-
tion.  
While this operationalisation of the German model obviously is value-laden we do not 
mean that a break from it would automatically imply the opposite, i.e. lack of solidar-
ity, inequality, authoritarianism – a partisan of the Anglo-American model might de-
scribe the same dimensions with words like opportunity, efficiency, accountability. 
                                                                                                                                        
of wage-earning labour”. In his empirically oriented work, Amable (2003) distinguishes 
three subsystems of the wage-labour nexus: Rules governing employment protection, 
industrial relations, and public employment policy.  
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What evidence suggests that such changes are occurring? Is there an interaction 
between changes occurring at the macro level with those at the micro/meso level? 
These are the questions we discuss in this paper. We link the conceptual question of 
what would constitute a “path break” with a discussion of preliminary empirical evi-
dence from our project, concentrating on change dynamics since the beginning of the 
1990s. We start our analysis at this point because, until the end of the 1980s, Ger-
many seemed to manage the economic crisis of the western “fordist” societies better 
than other countries. The critique of the “German model” began in the first half of the 
1990s, as a reaction to the economic stagnation that followed the reunification boom. 
We have chosen three industries for our analysis that allow a “most different 
cases” comparison: The automotive industry, the telecommunications equipment in-
dustry, and the video games industry. First, the automotive industry is a successful 
and highly competitive case of industrial development in Germany. It represents best 
the “classical” German model of employment relationships, but even in this industry, 
changes are taking place, leading us to ask, how deep are these changes? The tele-
com equipment industry and the video games industry are parts of the large complex 
of so called infocom industries representative of the “New Economy”. It is often 
claimed that the development of these industries is not compatible with the frame-
work for employment relations characterizing countries like Germany. Is this asser-
tion true? Can we trace the weaknesses of the telecom equipment and video games 
industries in Germany to prevailing forms of employment relations? And what 
changes in employment relationships are occurring in these industries?  
Table 1: Most different cases – choice of three industry research fields 
 Automotive industry Telecom equipment 
industry 
Video games in-
dustry 
Perceived industrial 
development in Ger-
many 
Successful Problematic Weak 
Questions 
How important are models of employment relationships for suc-
cessful industrial development? Which compatibilities/incompati-
bilities exist between modes of industrial organisation/business 
strategies and employment relationships? What does that mean 
for economic development in Germany and stability of (versus 
pressure for change in) employment relationships? 
Expected changes of 
employment relation-
ships 
Stability or gradual 
adaptation 
Contradictory devel-
opment, in part stabil-
ity, in part orientation 
to Anglo-American 
patterns 
New forms of em-
ployment relations, 
orientation to An-
glo-American pat-
terns 
Questions 
Which changes of employment relationships occur? Do these rep-
resent a break with the “German model”? What future dynamics 
and consequences are likely? 
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In the first part of this paper we summarise the debate about the German model of 
work and employment relations, its future and its implications for German competi-
tiveness. The main part of the paper discusses our expectations and reviews prelimi-
nary findings concerning the development and change of employment relationships in 
Germany. We start with a short summary of general trends and proceed to discuss 
evidence at the sectoral level. We present a preliminary analysis of changes in the 
three industries: automotive, telecom equipment, video games. We conclude by 
comparing industry-level developments and offer an assessment of their meaning for 
the general development of the German model.  
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2. The debate about the “Modell Deutschland” and 
main characteristics of the German system of 
labour regulation  
The notion of the “Modell Deutschland” was introduced by Helmut Schmidt in 1976, 
Chancellor of the first post-war social-democratic government, and was meant as a 
proud statement of its policy to harmonize economic competitiveness with progres-
sive labour and welfare regulation. Esser et al. (1980, 1983) took up this notion as a 
critical concept at the end of the 1970s. Referring to the export of technologically ad-
vanced consumer and producer goods that they observed as the dominant growth 
strategy in Germany, these authors saw an increasing trend of social segmentation 
between a well-trained and well-paid social core integrated into this strategy on the 
one hand and on the other, a growing portion of the workforce excluded from it for a 
number of reasons.. The latter group was to be dealt with by state social policies in 
order to prevent “destructive forces” and assure a minimum of social cohesion. While 
previously according to Esser et al. 1980, the welfare state had tried to reintegrate 
these marginalised groups by means of social “repair”, the strategy of “reparative” 
reintegration by the welfare state was replaced by the strategy of repression in the 
late 1970s.  
This critical perspective on the “Modell Deutschland” was reversed into a more 
positive perspective in the context of the debate about the supposed attributes char-
acterizing the model of “diversified quality production” (DQP). The DQP-debate arose 
in the mid-1980s as an attempt to explain the success of the German economy vis-à-
vis its international competitors. According to Streeck and Sorge (1988), in the 1970s 
mass production of standardised products and craft production of customised prod-
ucts dominated the German economy. In the 1980s, the development of microelec-
tronics and the deployment of computers and robots lead to the development of a 
new productive model: diversified quality production. DQP means the volume produc-
tion of customised products and a focus on competition on quality instead of price. 
The social compromise embodied in the German model of labour regulation 
seemed to be particularly well-suited to the DQP-strategy. Evidence of this could be 
seen in the multitude of company or plant-level agreements dealing with the introduc-
tion of microelectronics in the second half of the 1970s. In exchange for increased 
flexibility and the acceptance of new technology, labour gained employment protec-
tion, an increase in apprenticeship training, and increased works council participation 
in work design. The national government supported this pact with various programs 
(Jürgens 2003: 220).  
However, disillusionment about the stability and the survival chances of the 
“Rhine model” (Albert 1992) spread in the mid-1990s at the latest. Streeck and 
Kitschelt state (2003: 1): “The same institutions that once provided for economic 
prosperity and social cohesion today impede adjustment and stand in the way of a 
 – 8 – 
sustainable response to new problems.” In an earlier publication, Streeck identified 
three causes for the decline of the German model: The incompatibility of the German 
labour and capital market regulation with globalisation, the costs of German reunifica-
tion, and particularly the immanent exhaustion of the potentials of the DQP-model 
(Streeck 1995: 18ff.). Along this latter line of argument, one of the key problems was 
said to be deficient product innovation. According to Streeck, the German economy 
lost its winning margin in quality competition but retained its institutional rigidities and 
high social costs.  
While the DQP concept was dropped by Streeck (1995) who predicted a decay 
of the “institutionalised high-wage economy”, the DQP-argument resurged in the “va-
rieties of capitalism”-approach (Hall and Soskice 2001). The “varieties” approach 
stresses the comparative institutional advantages of a “coordinated market economy” 
like Germany, which provides for the competitiveness of industries in which incre-
mental innovations prevail: “It will be easier to secure incremental innovation where 
the workforce is skilled enough to come up with such innovations, secure enough to 
risk suggesting changes to products that might alter their job situation, and endowed 
with enough work autonomy to see these kinds of improvements as a dimension of 
their work. Thus, incremental innovation should be most feasible where corporate 
organization provides workers with secure employment, autonomy from close moni-
toring, and opportunities to influence the decisions of the firm, where the skill system 
provides workers with more than task-specific skills and, ideally, high levels of indus-
try-specific technical skills, and where close inter-firm collaboration encourages cli-
ents and suppliers to suggest incremental improvements to products or production 
processes” (Hall/Soskice 2001: 39). 
However, according to the authors, the institutional arrangements of the “Modell 
Deutschland” seem less suited to support the development of radically innovative 
industries. It is difficult for German firms to move quickly in and out of markets char-
acterised by rapidly evolving technologies. The high level of protection against dis-
missals makes fast changes of the competence profile of enterprises difficult. Large 
enterprises renounce the introduction of highly market-related incentive systems and 
opportunities for rapid career advancement for managers in order to safeguard the 
established institutional framework and compromises between stakeholders (Casper 
and Soskice 2004: 356). The German system of labour regulation does not support 
organisational destruction which the authors see as a prerequisite for the develop-
ment of radically innovative industries.  
The “varieties” approach draws a dichotomous picture: There are industries 
characterised by “incremental” innovation in which countries like Germany will be 
successful. The prime example is the automotive industry. However, Germany has 
little chance to develop competitive industries where “radical” innovation is required, 
as is the case for the infocom industry. 
As to the empirical evidence at a sectoral level, however, the “varieties ap-
proach” has difficulties defending its case. In view of the innovation dynamics at an 
industry level, a clear cut separation between “incremental” and “radical” forms of 
innovation is frequently impossible (Jürgens and Sablowski 2005: 128). Thus, Casper 
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and Whitley (2002: 35) admit: “There are more ‘degrees of freedom’ between the ori-
entation of national institutional frameworks and the ability of managers across 
groups of firms to develop innovative competencies than is suggested by varieties of 
capitalism-theory.”2 A similar point was made by Jürgens in the context of the DQP-
debate. In reviewing the development of the German automobile industry since the 
1980s, Jürgens concluded “that there may be no production model that is stable in 
the long run. Instead, the ‘fit’ between institutions and company strategies is much 
looser than is often argued” (Jürgens 2004: 412).3 
If these “degrees of freedom” exist, it is not possible to explain satisfactorily the 
success or the failure of industries by the national institutional arrangements. Sector 
and firm level specificities have to be taken into account. Here we draw from the con-
cept of “productive models” developed in the framework of regulation theory. Produc-
tive models represent governance compromises which balance the requirements 
from three domains: Product policy, employment relationships, and the productive 
organisation of the value process (Boyer/Freyssenet 2003: 42). If stable solutions to 
the requirements in these three areas can be found, then they can be regarded as 
“governance compromises” – i.e. compromises between interests not just in the rela-
tion of labour and capital, but rather between all relevant requirements and stake-
holders (Boyer/Freyssenet 2003: 43). 
In the following we discuss empirical evidence that links changes in employment 
relationships to broader changes in value chains and business strategies in the 
automotive, telecom equipment, and video games industry. We concentrate on the 
development of questions and hypotheses from preliminary empirical evidence in our 
research fields. Important questions are: Which processes of value chain restructur-
ing and which changes of business strategies take place? What effects in the area of 
employment relations can we expect, and what are our preliminary empirical findings 
consistent with these expectations? Do these changes represent a path immanent 
development or a break with the hitherto trajectory?  
While the “varieties of capitalism” approach emphasizes the strength as well as 
the weaknesses of the German political economy, a more radical critique of the Ger-
man model is brought forth in the so-called “Standort” debate.4 “Standort” critics see 
high wage costs at the root of high unemployment and low growth rates in Germany 
                                            
2 See Larrue/Lazonick/O’Sullivan (2003) and Casper/Whitley (2002) for further empirical 
evidence that contradicts the expectations of the “varieties of capitalism” approach. 
3 “It is true that German car producers developed a number of characteristics and strate-
gies in the 1980s which could be interpreted as supportive of the DQP thesis. However, 
none of the car-makers ever adopted DQP as an explicit strategy. Furthermore, the 
strategies adopted in the 1980s have hidden structural problems which became quite 
apparent during the crisis in the early 1990s. This forced the companies to develop new 
strategies that were only partially complementary with DQP. However these new strate-
gies also had their inherent problems, which became visible by the end of the 1990s” 
(Jürgens 2004: 412). 
4 The German word “Standort” means location or site. The highly controversial public 
“Standort” debate arose in the mid-1990s about the question of the competitiveness of 
Germany as a location for production. 
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(e.g., Sinn 2003a). The analysis is based on the neoclassical market ideal and de-
nounces all institutions suspected to hamper the adjustment capability of the labour 
market. The “Standort” critics demand a decentralisation of the collective bargaining 
system. They interpret the industry-wide collective agreements as a result of a cartel 
policy of trade unions that must be broken by the government (Sinn 2003a: 134), and 
call for the abolition of legal employment protections so that the threat of dismissals 
would force trade unions to moderate wage policy (Sinn 2003a: 142). Finally, they 
argue for a decisive reduction of social security benefits. “Even worse than the cartel 
policy of the trade unions, the welfare benefits are the main reason for unemploy-
ment. They give birth to wage demands that cannot be met by a market economy” 
(Sinn 2003a: 162). 
Meant as a final blow against those who argue that Germany’s export perform-
ance is evidence of the continuing strength of the “Modell Deutschland,” the notion of 
“bazaar economy” was introduced to suggest that the industrial strength of the Ger-
man economy has already been hollowed out to a large extent: “Due to the outsourc-
ing to Eastern Europe, the products of the German industry excel at the global mar-
kets and the German export statistics proudly present increases. However, the Audi 
cars enter the German export statistics with their full value but their motors are pro-
duced in Hungary. The ‘made in Germany’ becomes a false labelling. Only the as-
sembly takes place in Germany. The value-carrying parts come more and more from 
Eastern Europe. Germany is on the way to become a bazaar economy selling on 
global markets low-price and high-quality products that are no longer produced in 
Germany itself” (Sinn 2003b: 28, own translation). 
Which diagnosis is correct? Has the German work and employment model been 
hollowed out by economic restructuring and relocation processes and on the verge of 
a rupture, as the “Standort” critics suggest, or does it still represent a competitive en-
vironment but only for some industries as argues the “varieties” approach? And do 
not both the “Standort” critics and the “varieties” approach overlook clear differences 
between developments in different industries and changes that took place over the 
last fifteen years?  
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3. Changing employment relationships in Germany  
3.1 General trends – a short review 
The German model of employment relationships did not remain unchanged during 
the last fifteen years. In the following we review briefly some general trends of 
change before we discuss specific developments in the automotive, telecom equip-
ment and video games industries. In view of the pattern-setting role of the metal 
working industries and of the IG Metall some repetition in this account will be inevita-
ble. 
Withdrawal from negotiation arenas of social partnership? Changes in 
collective bargaining  
The system of industry-wide collective agreements5 is one of the main elements 
regulating the determination of wages, work and employment conditions in Germany 
at the sectoral level. In the past, the system of industry-wide collective agreements 
played a dual role: One the one hand, the levelling function of these agreements 
could be seen as an expression of solidarity between workers in different companies. 
Workers from small and medium firms benefited from the power of organised labour 
in big companies. On the other hand the system functioned as a “productivity whip” 
for enterprises lagging behind industry standards of productivity and costs. The price 
that the trade unions had to pay under the system was the obligation to moderate 
their wage claims by taking the economic conditions of small and medium companies 
into account and to abstain from exploiting negotiation margins in particularly suc-
cessful enterprises. On a company level, works councils used such leeway to 
achieve wage and benefit increases in a second bargaining round, thus leading to a 
strong wage drift in many cases.  
Do we observe a withdrawal of actors from this negotiating arena and an in-
crease of inequalities within industries? The system at the time of this writing is still 
largely in place. About one half of all German enterprises and about three-fourths of 
all employees in Germany are still covered by a collective agreement, the large ma-
jority of which are industry-level (see table 2). About one half of those enterprises not 
covered by a collective agreement nevertheless orientate themselves to existing 
agreements for their own wage level and benefit packages. Finally, while differentiat-
ing between blue and white collar employees, in many respects the collective agree-
                                            
5  Actually, the term “industry-wide” is misleading: The German “Flächentarifverträge” often 
cover more than one industry. The metalworking collective agreement, for instance, 
covers enterprises in the automotive, machinery, electronics and telecommunications 
equipment and other industries. The term “Flächentarifvertrag” refers to the fact that 
these agreements cover all those companies, whether big or small, which are members 
of the employers association. Other companies may have company-specific collective 
agreements (“Haustarifverträge”). 
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ments cover both status groups6 – except for the group of upper level (non-pay scale) 
salary personnel employed on the basis of individual contracts (außertarifliche An-
gestellte). We return to a discussion of this group later.  
Table 2:  Coverage by collective agreements in Germany in 2003 (in % of 
employees) 
 Industry-wide 
agreements 
Firm-level 
agreements 
Orientation to 
existing agree-
ments 
No agreement, 
no orientation 
West Germany 
East Germany  
62% 
43% 
  8% 
11% 
16% 
24% 
14% 
22% 
Source: IAB-Betriebspanel 
Despite the relatively stable structure of collective bargaining, however, there are four 
trends that challenge the collective bargaining system. First, lead enterprises exert 
pressure on their suppliers in systematic ways to reduce costs and increase flexibility. 
This pressure in many cases can hardly be met within the common framework pro-
vided by the industry-wide collective agreements. Either the suppliers break the in-
dustry collective agreement or they find other ways to pay less than the industry-level 
standards demand. This fosters a tendency towards a two-tier system.7 Second, en-
terprises restructure organisationally by creating profit centres or spinning off busi-
ness units. This is one of the major drivers of the movement towards company or 
plant level “concession bargaining” which has been spreading in Germany since the 
1990s. Third, enterprises use outsourcing to shift tasks into “cheaper” collective 
agreements or to remove them from the protection of a collective agreement alto-
gether. According to a survey from 2002, outsourcing led to an abandonment of a 
formerly existing collective agreement in 19% of outsourcing cases; in a further 39% 
of cases, a new – probably “cheaper” – collective agreement came into force for the 
employees concerned, while n the remaining 42% of cases, the employees continued 
to be covered by the former collective agreement (Bispinck/Schulten 2003: 158). And 
fourth, enterprises relocate operations to other countries i.e. change the labour regu-
lation regime altogether. The option of “off shoring” to low-cost countries has in-
creased since the accession of most of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
into the European Union. 
                                            
6  The status differentiation between hourly and salaried employees is being abolished 
currently by the introduction of common pay scales between the two groups (ERA-
collective agreements). 
7  The IG Metall now discusses the possibility of a two-stage wage policy distinguishing 
between high-profit and low-profit enterprises. According to Berthold Huber, vice chair-
man of the IG Metall, the trade union wage policy has, despite its “solidarity” ideal, either 
to recognise productivity and profitability differences between enterprises or to stay “sys-
tematically overstrained“ (Bispinck 2003: 400). 
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An institutional break with the German model in the sense of an abandonment of 
the negotiation arenas of social partnership (e.g. the collective bargaining system or 
the works councils) cannot be observed despite all the gradual changes noted above. 
However, the increasing inequality of risk and profit distribution within industries chal-
lenges the established industry-level and company-level compromises. Beyond these 
general trends, we expect considerable sectoral differences. Both the automotive and 
the telecom equipment industry belong to the metalworking sector but they differ in 
the strength of the trade unions and in their models of organisation: While manufac-
turing belongs to the core competencies of the lead enterprises in the case of the 
automobile industry, the telecom equipment industry represents a case of a vertically 
disintegrated industry where product innovation and marketing constitute the core 
competencies and manufacturing tends to become outsourced to contract manufac-
turers (Sturgeon and Lee 2002). The power relations and the pressure from out-
sourcing and off-shoring should be different in both industries and have different con-
sequences. The video games industry, last but not least, seems to develop outside of 
the German collective bargaining system. Does this mean that there are no forms of 
collective regulation? 
The decline of solidarity? New forms of flexibility and shrinking 
employment protection 
The high importance of employment protection is one of the main characteristics of 
German employment relationships. The unions have accepted from the beginning 
that this policy had to be complemented by the promotion of flexibility. In Germany, 
the company level became the paramount place of compromises about flexibility, of-
ten supported by the state. External labour market flexibility did not play an important 
role. In the 1980s and 1990s, working time flexibilisation represented the core of the 
flexibility strategy of German enterprises. In addition, the modernisation of the voca-
tional training system in the mid-1980s provided for more comprehensive job defini-
tions and increased the internal flexibility of companies. Thus, the tension between 
flexibility and employment security was dealt with compromises offering employment 
protection to core employees while using as flexibility buffers changes in working time 
regulations, early retirement, internal mobility of employees, and, to a lesser extent 
temporary employees.  
Since the mid-1990s and particularly in the second half of that decade,, the 
German government stepped up its efforts to facilitate the use of fixed-term work 
contracts and temporary agency work. The aim is to narrow the core of the “secure” 
jobs and to extend the “insecure” flexibility buffer. Since the law on promotion of em-
ployment (Beschäftigungsförderungsgesetz) was passed in 1985, the possibilities to 
hire employees on fixed-term contracts have been gradually extended (Linne and 
Vogel 2003). However, the aggregated effects of legislative deregulation on the ac-
tual use of fixed-term contracts seem to be quite limited: Since the first half of the 
1990s, the ratio of fixed-term employment remained stable at around 8% in Western 
Germany or even experienced a small reduction from 16% to around 12% in Eastern 
Germany (IAB-Betriebspanel). 
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The case of temporary agency work indicates a similar limitation of legislative ac-
tion. Although the use of temporary work has been made easier, the share of agency 
work in total employment increased only slightly from 0.2% to 1%  between 1985 and 
2000 (Rudolph 2003: 9). However, the aggregate numbers hide differences between 
industries. The share of agency workers in some firms in the German telecommuni-
cations equipment industry can amount up to 30% (e.g. in the Infineon works in 
Dresden), while for the most past it does not exceed 5% in automotive plants. In the 
computer games industry, temporary agency work does not play any role.  
Apart from the relative insignificance of temporary work in quantitative terms, its 
regulation is quite characteristic. New legislation fostering the integration of tempo-
rary agency work into the collective bargaining system can be seen as an effort to 
revitalise the institutional framework of the “Modell Deutschland.” According to the 
2004 law on temporary agency work (Arbeitnehmerüberlassungsgesetz), wages and 
employment conditions of agency workers have to be regulated by a collective 
agreement. If a temporary work agency is not covered by a collective agreement, the 
agency workers have to be paid according to the collective agreement valid for the 
host company. If the agency itself is covered by a collective agreement pay can be 
lower, however. The pattern of legal regulation is interesting in itself: it requires 
agreements within the collective bargaining arena in order to allow for a discrimina-
tion of pay between agency and regular workers, thereby strengthening existing insti-
tutional patterns of labour regulation. 
In the context of increased competitive pressure and relocation threats, the so 
called “plant-level pacts for employment and competitiveness” (betriebliche Bünd-
nisse zur Beschäftigungssicherung und Wettbewerbsstärkung) have developed as a 
means to reconfigure the compromises between flexibility and employment protec-
tion. These agreements are negotiated between the company or plant management 
and works councils and aim at securing jobs. Most often they are initiated by compa-
nies that are trying to restore the competitiveness of the enterprise through costs re-
ductions and a flexibilisation of working time and offer employment protection in ex-
change (Rehder 2003: 95). The opening of a company/plant level bargaining arena 
additional to the sectoral level takes place on the basis of so called “opening 
clauses,” which have been introduced into industry-wide agreements since the late 
1980s. Opening clauses allow the enterprises to bargain for different forms of devia-
tions from the industry-level agreement. This bargaining takes place with the works 
council of the enterprise and the trade union responsible for the industry-level agree-
ment.  
In 2003, plant-level employment pacts existed in 23% of all companies with 
works councils.8 They are most widespread among large enterprises (42% of com-
panies with more than 1,000 employees) (Massa-Wirth/Seifert 2004). In 2004, the 
collective agreement between IG Metall and the Metal Employers Association (Pforz-
heimer Abschluss) opened the way for an even broader movement toward such 
pacts. Triggering this development was a “blood and tears” speech of chancellor 
                                            
8  All sectors incl. public services.  
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Schröder. He challenged the collective bargaining partners that if they did not facili-
tate local bargaining he would introduce a law limiting their collective bargaining 
autonomy (Tarifautonomie). The 2004 agreement still keeps the industry-level actors 
in control of local bargaining. IG Metall requires companies to provide balance sheets 
and asks external auditors to prepare an expert assessment prior to agreement in 
local plant-level negotiations. As a prior formal requirement for local bargaining, the 
companies have to prove that they are experiencing economic difficulty. Neverthe-
less, on the basis of the Pforzheim agreement, any company wishing to get special 
bargaining can force the union to enter into this procedure. In fact, in the bargaining 
districts the IG Metall now is engaged heavily in plant/company level bargaining. 
The aim of management in these plant-level employment pacts is unequivocal: 
To exchange employment protection for cost reductions and flexibilisation of working 
and employment conditions. Only 13% of the employment pacts contained no meas-
ures for securing employment at all (Massa-Wirth/Seifert 2004). However, three ca-
veats to this general rule have to be taken into consideration (Rehder 2003: 99): 
First, employment protection is guaranteed only for a certain time period. Second, 
enterprises always preserve the right to renegotiate the agreements if the market 
conditions change. Third, the employment protection has a “defensive” character and 
aims at ruling out dismissals or plant closures. Only in a few cases do the agree-
ments include commitments from companies and/or plants regarding future invest-
ment or production programs. 
In summary, employment protection is becoming a more and more costly goal for 
organised labour. We expect, however, that the differences in power relations and 
forms of industry organisation result in different degrees of pressure for change in 
different industries. For instance, we have mentioned already differences in the use 
of temporary work. It is particularly the “new economy” industries, like telecom 
equipment production, that are characterised by a very high need for flexibility and a 
high level of vertical disintegration. The inequality in the distribution of risk between 
core and non-core employees and between employees of focal enterprises and those 
of subordinate supplier firms in the value chains should be higher in the telecom 
equipment industry and the video games industry than in the automobile industry. 
This increasing inequality could be also an indication that the idea of the recognition 
and balance of all interests in the enterprise is losing importance and support – to the 
point of a fundamental change in the organisational logic of enterprises.  
Increasing inequality? Organisation-centred and market-centred 
incentive systems 
The question here is whether a transformation from “organisation-centred” to “mar-
ket-centred” incentive systems is taking place in German enterprises. Organisation-
centred systems focus on employment security, long-term career opportunities and 
hierarchical control. Market-centred systems try to make use of the motivating and 
disciplining effects of inequality and market risks in the wage and employment condi-
tions. 
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There are two forms of incentive system regulation in Germany: incentive sys-
tems for blue and white collar employees covered by collective bargaining agree-
ments and systems relating to mid and upper level employees not covered by collec-
tive “pay scales”. The latter group consists of top management and the group of non-
pay scale employees (Außertarifliche). The definition and accordingly the number of 
such employees itself is a contested issue in companies, and so we find considerable 
variance as to their number as a percentage of the total workforce. Unfortunately, 
there are no systematic data on the number of non-pay scale employees, although it 
can be assumed that is has strongly increased over the last years (Blanke 2003: 22). 
In the chemical industry and in the electronics industry (e.g. Infineon), for instance, 
the share of such employees amounts to about 20% of total employment (Tesler 
2002; Infineon 2001). The incentive systems for non-pay scale employees are nego-
tiated individually – the incentive systems for rank and file employees are regulated 
by industry-wide collective agreements.  
In the course of the decentralisation trend in the collective bargaining system and 
the introduction of cost and profit centres (Moldaschl 1998), German enterprises 
have fostered the introduction of new incentive systems. The first main trend is the 
spread of target agreements (Zielvereinbarungen). While in some companies (such 
as DaimlerChrysler) target agreements at the level of production teams have been 
practiced, in the area of blue collar work since the mid-1990s this is still the excep-
tion. Target agreements with individualised performance criteria have become wide-
spread in the mid- and upper-levels of white collar employees however.  
The second main trend is the increase of the share of variable parts of the sala-
ries for non-pay scale employees and the introduction of new forms of incentives – 
stock options, for instance. An individualised and market-centred incentive system 
has existed already in Germany for a long time for non-pay scale employees, though 
not to the same extent as in Anglo-American countries. Until the mid-1990s, however, 
no stock option programme existed in Germany. Since that time, more than 80% of 
the enterprises listed in the DAX-30 have implemented stock option programmes 
(FAZ, 24.3.2003). The New Economy boom gave rise to start up companies remu-
nerating their employees with stocks or stock options, i.e. with the promise of future 
value increases.  
While we expect little inter-industry variance concerning blue-collar workers, the 
telecom equipment industry should be the forerunner of the transformation of incen-
tive systems for white collar and non-pay scale employees. Due to changes in the 
social structure of enterprises, the transformation of incentive systems for white collar 
and non-pay scale employees has important effects. In the course of outsourcing and 
restructuring activities, the number of white collar and non-pay scale employees in 
lead industrial enterprises increases step by step. Telecommunications OEMs in par-
ticular become increasingly “white collar enterprises” and remove themselves from 
the collective regulation of wage conditions. But can we observe this trend in the 
automobile industry, too? And how are the incentive systems shaped in the video 
games industry, where forms of collective bargaining do not exist? 
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High-skill work organisation 
Since the governmental programme for a Humanisation of Work in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s the connection between work organisation and skill development 
has been regarded as a central element of the German system. This connection was 
seen as the precondition for developing “intelligent solutions” for manufacturing prob-
lems, giving Germany a specific edge in this regard over international competition. 
On the basis of this understanding, companies were ready to invest in skill develop-
ment in the form of apprenticeship training of school graduates and of introducing 
new forms of work to systematically use the high-skill levels resulting from this train-
ing.  
The upgrading of skill levels was seen as a prerequisite for coping with the intro-
duction of new technologies and the increase in process automation (see Jürgens 
et al. 1993 for this development in the car industry, as well as Herrigel 1989). As a 
consequence of this “qualification offensive” the proportion of manual workers com-
pleting an apprenticeship, which traditionally had been high in German manufacturing 
companies, rose even further. This difference in skill structures can be clearly seen in 
Table 3, which compares skill levels in the USA, UK and Germany in 1993. Most of 
the employees in the “intermediate” skill level are workers who have finished an ap-
prenticeship (the so-called Facharbeiter, or skilled manual worker). In the German 
auto industry this intermediate level makes up two thirds of the whole manufacturing 
workforce, as compared to one third in the UK and less than one sixth in the Ameri-
can auto industry. 
Table 3: Skill level distribution of the manufacturing workforce in the motor 
vehicle industry (in percent) 
Skill level US UK Germany 
High 16.6 7.3 6.7 
Intermediate 15.1 37.7 65.4 
Low 68.3 55.0 28.0 
Based on 1993 figures. Source: Mason and O’Mahony (1998) 
The system of vocational training and the Facharbeiter had played a central role in 
the production strategies of German industrial companies in the 1980s in general, not 
just in the auto industry. When looking at the intake of new apprenticeships for skilled 
trades in the manufacturing sector as a whole it is clear that around 1990 a funda-
mental shift in policy occurred. As Figure 1 shows, the level of intake of new appren-
tices in manufacturing in the 1990s was almost half of the level in the 1980s.  
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Figure 1: New Apprenticeships for Skilled Trades in Manufacturing  
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Source: Senatsverwaltung für Arbeit, Berufliche Bildung und Frauen (1999: 23), based on 
Statistisches Bundesamt, Fachserie 11, Reihe 3 
What does this decline in the number of apprenticeships indicate? Have German en-
terprises abandoned their investive orientation towards skill and competence devel-
opment? Are there differences between the automobile industry where manufacturing 
remains a core competence, and the telecom equipment industry, where manufactur-
ing is being outsourced to contract manufacturers and low-wage countries? And what 
role does qualification and skill development play in the video games industry as a 
young sector? 
Off-shoring as the “exit” option  
A relocation of production to other countries whose primary motive is to evade the 
regulation framework and the wage costs in Germany would obviously mean a clear 
break with the “German model”. The foreign direct investments (FDI) of German en-
terprises is often cited as proof that German companies increasingly take the “exit” 
choice. At the same time the negative FDI balance in Germany (FDI in Germany – 
FDI of German enterprises abroad) since the 1980s is cited as proof that Germany is 
an unattractive site for foreign investors.  
The Council of Economic Advisors (Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der 
gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung), in an attempt to dampen down the heated pub-
lic debate about relocation, has argued that the actual importance of relocation proc-
esses is considerably lower than the public debate suggests. In its last publication, 
the Council stressed three points: (1) a negative FDI balance is nothing unusual for 
an export-oriented economy like Germany and has no clear implications for the de-
velopment of employment; (2) the size of German FDI in comparison to the invest-
ments of German enterprises in Germany has declined since the 1970s, suggesting 
that German enterprises invest increasingly more in Germany than in foreign coun-
tries; (3) for the most part, German FDI is driven by the motive of opening up new 
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markets and does not rule out the expansion of employment in Germany (Sachver-
ständigenrat 2005: 485-487). 
The Council’s general argument includes one caveat: It acknowledges that Ger-
man FDI in Eastern European countries and in China is driven by the motive of lower-
ing production and wage costs and could result in a reduction of production and em-
ployment in Germany (Sachverständigenrat 2005: 487). However, as only 6.7% of 
the German FDI in 2002 was directed to Eastern European countries and China, the 
quantitative importance of these locations remains limited, according to the Council.  
In view of the apparent differences between industries, a closer look into industry 
dynamics is necessary. In the case of the German automobile industry, recent stud-
ies stress the increasing relocation of production to Eastern Europe (e.g. Ernst and 
Young 2004; Nunnenkamp 2005). Off-shoring seems to be particularly strong in the 
telecom equipment industry (e.g. Brown and Linden 2005), including the domain of IT 
services (Boes and Schwemmle 2005; DB Research 2005). With regard to our third 
industry, the video game industry, there seems to be little pressure for relocation at 
this stage. 
Besides the question of the quantitative importance of off-shoring, the qualitative 
question of changes in employment relationships driven by off-shoring processes in 
host and in home countries will be an important aspect of our further research. Stud-
ies belonging to the “national business model” approach stress the transfer of work 
and employment models to the host countries of FDI, while contributions to the litera-
ture based on the “productive model” approach have emphasised the “hybridisation” 
processes which result in a combination of elements of the home and host countries 
(Boyer et al. 1998). Particularly for the German case, various authors have empha-
sised a tendency of a “regime/model flight” (Modellflucht), however (Meardi and Toth 
2005). In this case, companies do not even try to implement their home country work 
and employment model. The same argument is advanced by Bluhm (2001) for the 
case of Siemens and Dörrenbächer (2002), who examined the development of the 
sites of ten German enterprises in Hungary. To what extent can we observe the 
“Modellflucht” and what repercussions does it have for work and employment in Ger-
many? 
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4. Changes and trends in the automotive, telecom-
munications, and video games industry 
4.1 Automobile industry 
The automobile industry is one of Germany’s core industries. It is one of the major 
employers and has been of the few “growth engines” of the Germany economy in 
recent years. With 802,000 employees, the automotive industry (as defined by NACE 
34) accounted for 12% of employment and 20% of investments in the German manu-
facturing sector, and for 23% of all German exports (VDA 2004; OECD 2004).  
The automobile industry is a traditional labour union stronghold; its patterns of 
industrial relations have a large influence on the manufacturing industries and the 
German institutional setting of labour regulation as a whole. In 2004, the unionisation 
level was 75% in the German car industry, whereas the unionisation rate of the over-
all economy was an average of only 30% (Eiro observer 01’ 04: vi). All automotive 
OEMs have powerful works councils. Metal-industry collective agreements play a 
central role. A special case is Volkswagen. The company is not a member of the em-
ployers association and therefore not subject to the general collective agreement 
(Flächentarifvertrag); it has its own company collective agreement with the metal-
working union. The automobile industry seems thus to be the prime example of the 
“German model.” 
1991 was the year with the highest employment level in the history of the Ger-
man car industry to date: 806,000 employees. Employment fell over the subsequent 
five years to 682,000 in 1996 before increasing again. By 2004, auto industry em-
ployment had recovered to 802,000. As to domestic production, the first half of the 
1990s was characterized by stagnation, followed however by a sharp increase to al-
most double its level of the early 1990s by 2004. This increase in domestic produc-
tion was accompanied by an even higher increase in the value of exports over the 
same period. The fact that the German car producers expanded drastically their for-
eign operations at the same time – the proportion of cars produced by German car 
makers outside of Germany in their total production rose from 27% in 1991 to 46% in 
2004 – demonstrates a remarkably strong performance by the German car industry. 
But it’s not all roses with the German car industry. As Figure 2 shows, the indus-
try experienced a severe crisis in the first half of the 1990s. Between 1991 and 1994 
over twenty percent of the workforce lost their jobs. The number of German employ-
ees at Mercedes-Benz decreased by 36,000, at Volkswagen by 18,000, at Opel by 
9,000, at Audi by 7,000, and at Ford by 5,000. The industry-wide workforce reduction 
would have been far greater without the introduction of the 35-hour week. At Volks-
wagen, the 28.8-hour week became the new work time standard at the end of 1992 
(Haipeter 2000). In addition to this, other measures like early retirement were used in 
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order to prevent dismissals.9 This crisis served as a trigger for the restructuring of 
industry organisation. And under the surface of stable, even increasing employment 
levels, problems have accumulated during the first half of the 2000s again. Thus the 
German workforce of General Motors/Opel was cut by 10,000 in 2005, and Daimler-
Chrysler, Ford and Volkswagen also announced major redundancies.  
Figure 2: Production Value of Domestic Production, of Exports and the 
Development of Employment of the German Car Industry (1991-2004) 
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The question of how they can be facilitated within the context of the employment 
guarantees stipulated by company agreements (see below) is an open question at 
this stage. Increasing overcapacities and the stagnation in demand lead to a fierce 
competition among mass producers. Although the premium segment producers still 
report increasing sales revenues and high profitability, they are also engaged in in-
tense cost and productivity competition that enforces rationalisation measures. Thus, 
the picture of a rather steady and continuous upwards development is misleading. It 
                                            
9  The employment of OEMs is concentrated in large companies: in 2002, 97.7% of em-
ployees have worked in 21 companies with more than 1,000 employees each. Small 
companies with less than 100 employees contribute less than 1% of employment. Em-
ployment of suppliers is significantly less concentrated. In 2002, large scale companies 
with more than 1,000 employees encompassed 64% of overall employment in the sup-
plier industry, while small companies in the supplier industry with less than 100 employ-
ees accounted for 12.6% of employment (Statistisches Bundesamt, Fachserie 4.3.).  
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conceals a drastic restructuring of the productive organization of the industry, organi-
zationally as well as spatially. In particular, the following three trends should be men-
tioned in this regard: 
– the restructuring of supplier relations, and with that increased outsourcing of ac-
tivities to suppliers, the tiering of the supplier structures and the specialization of 
companies on specific roles (such as modular or system supply); 
– measures to achieve a closer integration and coordination of cooperation proc-
esses within and between companies; 
– the increase of foreign activities, relocation of work to enter new markets or 
benefit from low-cost conditions. 
Each of these trends has deep effects on existing structures and governance com-
promises concerning work and employment relations.  
The decline of solidarity? New forms of flexibility and shrinking 
employment protection  
Since the experience with personnel reductions in the wake of the first oil crisis in 
1973, the guarantee of employment security traditionally has been considered high in 
the car industry. The prevalent consensus between management and labour was that 
“secure jobs” foster cooperation and motivation and therefore are instrumental for 
productivity increases. Behind this common understanding was the clear commitment 
of works councils and unions to protect employment while at the same time support-
ing productivity measures. 
Since the 1990s, increasingly intense competition has challenged the former 
consensus on employment protection. The possibilities to compensate productivity 
increases through an expansion of production diminished. The fall of the Iron Curtain 
and the following integration of the Eastern European countries into the European 
Union provided the German automotive enterprises with the opportunity to benefit 
from a low-wage and highly-trained work force close to Germany. Management 
openly threatened to relocate, and “whipsawing”, i.e. playing off plants against each 
other, became a widespread practice.  
So called company-level pacts for employment protection have been the primary 
result of these efforts to renegotiate the balance between employment protection and 
flexibility. These employment pacts between the management and works coun-
cils/trade unions develop on the basis of “opening clauses” in industry-level collective 
agreements that allow for enterprise-level collective bargaining under certain circum-
stances. In the metalworking sector, the first opening clauses appeared in the context 
of the reduction of weekly working time to 35 hours, realised step-by-step between 
1984 and 1994 (Bispinck 2004: 239f.). In 1990, the IG Metall agreed to concede to 
enterprises the possibility to prolong the weekly working time for part of the workforce 
up to 40 hours (depending on the bargaining district for 13% resp. 18% of the em-
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ployees of a company which wants to apply this clause).10 The second phase of the 
introduction of opening clauses was initiated by the crisis of the East German metal-
working industry. In 1993, the IG Metall and the employer association Gesamtmetall 
introduced a so called “hardship clause” into the industry-wide agreement. In case of 
economic difficulties, the enterprises were allowed to suspend the agreed wage ad-
justment in Eastern Germany to the West German level. The third phase began in 
2002. In this year, the metalworking agreement provided for the possibility of deviat-
ing from the agreed wage increase in case of a “danger to the economic survival of 
an enterprise” (Bispinck 2004: 240). In 2004, this clause was extended by the Pforz-
heim agreement mentioned in the previous section, which covers not only wages but 
all regulation areas.  
There have been three main waves of employment pacts in the automobile in-
dustry: The first started in 1993 and was initiated by the crisis of the German auto-
mobile industry at that time; the second took place during the consolidation phase of 
the industry between 1996 and 2001; the third wave comprised agreements con-
cluded in the years 2004 and 2005. The agreements of all three waves contain em-
ployment guarantees and investment promises. The duration of employment guaran-
tees increased from two years on average in the first wave of agreements to a dura-
tion of six or seven years in the third wave. 
While the first two waves focused on working time flexibility, the third wave con-
cessions of trade unions and works councils indicate that the balance of power be-
tween labour and enterprises has changed profoundly. Pointing at international com-
parisons of labour costs and productivity levels, companies extensively use the threat 
to relocate production to low cost countries (cf. Eiro observer 1’ 04: v). A spectacular 
case was Opel. The agreement here followed an earlier one at Mercedes and trig-
gered a similar bargaining process at Volkswagen. Despite many differences, the 
principal elements of the agreements are quite similar. Taking as an example the 
Mercedes agreement “Securing the Future 2012” (Zukunftssicherung 2012) which 
covers the German sites of Mercedes, the essential elements are the following: The 
management side committed to certain investment levels and product allocation 
plans and it ruled out redundancy measures until the end of 2011. Management also 
agreed to keep the level of vocational training, i.e. the number of apprentices em-
ployed during this time. The works council, on the other side, accepted a reduction of 
basic wages by 2.79 % for all employees and a special regulation for so called “ser-
vices” employees with less favourable working time and salaries. The wages for 
newly recruited workers starting in 2005 were reduced by 8% on average. In addition, 
company-internal mobility was increased by establishing a new unit called DC 
“Move”. All new recruitments and graduated apprentices enter DC “Move” for 36 
months maximum and can be moved to all sites of the company. An extension to ear-
lier age groups eligible for early retirement, a further flexibilisation of working time for 
                                            
10  In 2004, these agreements were extended: the new metalworking industry agreements 
allowed for a return to the 40 hours week for up to 50% of the employees on the basis of 
an agreement between the enterprise and the works council. 
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R&D-employees, and the specification of the maximal number of agency workers in 
Mercedes plants (4%) round out the agreement.  
While agreements in the early 1990s had focused on working time and working 
time flexibility, straight wage concessions constitute one of the main elements of the 
recent company pacts for employment. The trade unions and works councils suc-
ceeded in defending the employment security of the employees at the German auto-
motive OEMs only at the expense of wage reductions and an increasing differentia-
tion and segmentation of wage and employment conditions. 
The employment of agency workers is a further important trend in the car indus-
try – however, compared to other industries it takes place in a regulated and negoti-
ated way. The expansion of agency work in the German automotive industry is nego-
tiated with works councils. The case of Ford illustrates the negotiation processes: 
The corporate works council and the management of Ford have agreed that agency 
workers in their assembly plants at Cologne-Niehl and Saarlouis will be paid on the 
basis of the IG Metall collective agreement. This plant agreement means that agency 
workers will receive 750 Euros more per month than before. The plant agreement 
also sets a limit for the number of agency workers: they must not exceed 3% in each 
of the production areas, except during product launches, at which time they may 
reach 8%. Workers will only be hired from those agencies that follow the collective 
agreement between the unions and the Bundesverband Zeitarbeit, the federal asso-
ciation of agencies.  
The most advanced approach to the use of agency work can be found at Volks-
wagen and is worth discussing in some detail. Already in the mid-1990s Volks-
wagen’s personnel department demanded an own temporary work agency. A first 
step in this direction was realised in 1997 with the establishment of the Wolfsburg 
AG, a public private partnership between the city of Wolfsburg and Volkswagen 
which besides running a personnel service agency (PSA), engaged in a number of 
different business areas: an innovation campus, an agency to facilitate the settlement 
of suppliers, a fun and science park, a health project, a network called “economy and 
sustainability”. The original aim was to create 1,500 jobs in services in the Wolfsburg 
region. Up to the end of 2004, the Wolfsburg AG reports to have created more than 
8,000 jobs: more than 2,000 jobs through the personnel service agency, about 1,500 
jobs in the innovation campus with 243 start-ups, and about 3,900 jobs at suppliers 
opening up plants in Wolfsburg (http://www.autovision-gmbh.com, 14.4.2005). 
In order to expand beyond the city limits of Wolfsburg to which the WOB AG is 
restricted, Volkswagen established another personal service agency in 2001: AutoVi-
sion. In 2005, AutoVision provides 2,000-3,000 temporary workers mainly for the 
company’s own purpose but also to external companies like DaimlerChrysler. In addi-
tion, it employs a further 2,000 workers for service, logistics and manufacturing activi-
ties that are in threat of being outsourced from Volkswagen plants. When compared 
with Volkswagen, Auto Vision offers not only high employment flexibility but also cost 
advantages that result from its specific collective agreement. AutoVision offers wages 
according to the metalworking industry agreement which sets nominal monthly wages 
10% lower in comparison to VW’s workers. However, taking into account that the 
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regular working week at AutoVision has 35 hours while it is only 28.8 hours at VW, 
the difference in hourly wages amounts to 26%. 
Increasing inequality? Organisation-centred and market-centred 
incentive systems  
Compared to the general trends in changing forms of employment protection and 
flexibility discussed above, changes in incentive systems are rather weak in the 
automotive industry and do not show a clear trend. Incentive systems in the automo-
bile industry are regulated by collective bargaining agreements. Highly formalised 
rules in these agreements prevent a performance-based individualisation of wages 
for blue collar workers (interview auto D1, 31.10.2004). In the area of non-pay scale 
employees, however, individualisation of variable wage components plays an in-
creasing role. In the case of Volkswagen, variable wage components for non-pay 
scale employees can amount for up to 23% of their yearly remuneration. Besides the 
individual bonus, there is a company bonus. The bonus for individual performance is 
increasingly linked to target agreements.  
Besides the increasing role of target agreements and individualised, market-
related salary components for non-pay scale employees, it is worth pointing to 
Volkswagen’s innovative Auto5000 concept, often known under the name 
“5000x5000” (see Schumann 2005). The Auto5000 collective agreement of 2001 was 
the result of negotiations between VW management, the works council and the IG 
Metall and a reaction to off-shoring pressure and competitiveness problems of VW’s 
German plants. 3,500 employees in the production of the minivan “Touran” are cov-
ered by this agreement. One of its highly contentious elements is the levelling of the 
wages: a standard wage of around 2,500 € (5,000 DM) is paid to all employees. An-
other disputed element is the linking of the working time to the achievement of the 
production plan, the so called „program wage” (Programmlohn). If the employees fail 
to realise the production goals during the regular working time they have to accept 
unpaid overtime work – provided that the enterprise can prove that the workers are 
responsible for not achieving the production goals. However, the collective agree-
ment for Auto5000 limits the maximum unpaid overtime work to one hour a day. 
Segmentation of employment conditions within companies and in the 
supply chain 
One of the main trends concerning the employment relationships in the German 
automotive industry is the increasing cost and relocation pressure on suppliers and 
an increasing segmentation of employment conditions among and within enterprises. 
Traditionally, the industry-wide collective agreements in the metalworking sector have 
limited the extent of differentiation of wage and employment conditions in the auto-
motive sector. The vast majority of suppliers were covered by the industry collective 
agreements, and the OEMs paid wages that surpassed the industry standards. This 
differentiation of wage levels can be illustrated on the example of Volkswagen:11 
                                            
11  Basic wages for skilled production workers are the basis for this comparison.  
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– The hourly wage level of Volkswagen’s collective agreement (Haustarifvertrag) 
for employees with an entry date before 2005 is around 25% above the metal-
industry collective agreement, 
– The wage level of important suppliers like Bosch is about 10-12% below that of 
VW, 
– Wages of all metal-related suppliers are defined by the metal-industry agree-
ment, 
– The wages at suppliers covered by other collective agreements (textile, chemical 
industry etc.) are below the metal agreement by 10-30%. 
Since the mid-1990s, two main processes have affected the differentiation of wage 
and employment conditions within the automotive sector. First, most of the OEMs 
have begun to reduce the wage gap (including indirect wages) vis-à-vis the general 
metal-industry level. Thus, since the mid-90s, Opel has stepwise reduced its wages 
from about 130% of the metal-industry level to about 115%. The new collective 
agreement of Volkswagen adapts the wages of new recruitments from 2005 onwards 
to the metal-industry level. After several steps of reducing the payments exceeding 
the industry level in the 1990s, Mercedes has concluded an agreement with its works 
council in 2004 that, from 2005 on, lowers the wages by 8% for newly recruited em-
ployees. These changes mean a tiering of wage levels at the OEMs and, on the av-
erage, a movement toward the industry-level standards. 
Secondly, there is considerable pressure on suppliers to reduce their wage levels 
even more. Being bound by the industry-wide collective agreements, the suppliers 
have two options: to break the industry collective agreement or to find other ways to 
pay less than the industry-level standards demand. Both can be observed. Suppliers 
leave the industry collective agreements and “hardship clauses” are introduced in the 
industry-level agreements to create possibilities to pay considerably lower wages in 
the case of a difficult economic situation.  
There is also an increasing tendency toward differentiation of wage and employ-
ment conditions within the OEMs, as the example of Volkswagen illustrates. Since 
Volkswagen could not achieve wage reductions for the whole of its employees, it has 
started to introduce special collective agreements for those parts of the enterprise 
where changes could be enforced. There are now the following employment status 
groups at Volkswagen: 
– The core group of employees which have entered the company up to the end of 
2004: At this time the standard working time for this group is 28.8 hours a week 
and the monthly wage for skilled workers 2,603 €.  
– The group of newly hired Volkswagen employees with entry date 2005: Accord-
ing to the collective agreement of 2004, special clauses apply to this group re-
garding pay and working time. While the employment protection is the same as 
for core employees, the monthly wages of this group are on average 8% lower 
and the working time is at 35 hours a week. Due to the longer working time, the 
hourly wages for this group of employees are 24% lower compared to the core 
group. 
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– Similarly, the Auto5000 employees receive monthly wages 5% lower than the 
core employees. The extension of working time to 35 hours per week compared 
to 28.8 hours for the core employees means that the hourly wages are in fact 
21% lower compared to what the core group receives. 
– Employees with fixed-term contracts and employees of AutoVision GmbH that 
work as agency workers for VW constitute a third layer. Besides the fact that the 
employment protection does not apply to this group they receive lower wages 
and work the 35-hours week. This leads to a factual difference on average of 
26% in hourly wages. 
– Agency workers employed by the personnel service agency of Wolfsburg AG 
constitute the fourth layer. The hourly wages for this group of employees are on 
average 40% below the VW core employees. 
It is not only important that the segmentation of employment conditions increases at 
VW, but that there is meanwhile no longer permeability between the segments: there 
is little chance for the individual to make a career from the periphery to the core.  
Figure 3: Segmentation of the employment status at Volkswagen 
VW core
employees
(entry data
before 2005)
VW 5000
employees
and
new VW
employees 
(entry data
2005ff.)
AutoVision
workers
VW
fixed-term
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and
WOB AG
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workers
decreasing wages and employment security  
Outsourcing and Off-shoring – Out of Germany or out of business? 
The diagnosis of the CEO of the Opel AG is stark: “Out of Germany or out of busi-
ness” announces Carl-Peter Forster (2004). Indeed, transnationalisation and reloca-
tion of production have gained in importance in the German automobile industry. 
Eastern Europe, in particular, becomes the preferred location of investment. The mo-
tives for investments by German automobile OEMs in Eastern Europe have changed: 
The reduction of production costs is gaining in importance relative to the opening up 
of new markets: Eastern Europe becomes a platform for exports to Western Europe 
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and exerts a considerable pressure on Western European production locations (Nun-
nenkamp 2005).  
The proportion of German-make vehicles that are made abroad to newly regis-
tered vehicles in Germany has increased markedly in recent years. Overall, a fifth of 
German carmaker’s vehicles registered in Germany are made abroad (Automobil-
woche, 13.7.2004, p.4) In 2003, the share of total passenger cars made in Poland, 
the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, and Slovakia amounted to 18% of all Ger-
man make vehicles produced abroad (VDA 2004, Tatsachen und Zahlen: 55) The 
front runner was the Volkswagen Group which integrated the Czech Skoda between 
1991 and 2001 and stepped up the development of production in the Slovak Republic 
(Podevins 2004). The Volkswagen subsidiary Audi now produces all engines and the 
sports car TT at Györ in Hungary. Other motor vehicle manufacturers which had al-
ready built new works in CEE countries in the 1990s were Fiat in Poland, GM/Opel in 
Poland and Hungary, Toyota in Poland, and Suzuki in Hungary. In 2003, the French 
credit risk insurer Euler-Sfac estimates total investment in Poland, the Czech Repub-
lic, and the Slovak Republic in the motor vehicle sector since the demise of commu-
nist regimes at US$ 20 billion. 
The supply industry is especially attracted by the low labour costs in CEE 
locations, since, labor costs account for a percentage of total costs in this segment of 
the industry (25% of total costs for suppliers as compared with 15% for final 
assembly (Dudenhöffer 2004: 3). As the supplier basis in Central Europe catches up 
with final assembly, this sector can, as surveys suggest, be expected to record 
similar or higher growth rates than in the automotive industry as a whole.12 In recent 
years considerable amounts have been invested by major suppliers. The American 
supplier Delphi, for example, now employs 5,000 people in Poland alone. Its total 
investment there amounts to US$ 250 million.13 Small and medium-sized companies 
in the supplier sector are often under particular pressure, since their financial 
structure obliges them to generate the capital needed for growth directly from profits 
out of their revenues. In view of the massive cost pressure from final producers, 
relocating to Central and Eastern Europe is often the only solution. 
As table 3 shows, there are enormous discrepancies within Europe in wages and 
salaries and in labour costs as a whole. In table 4 the German level is set at 100. 
Even within Western Europe, values scatter up to 50% of the German level; and in 
Eastern European countries they range from 20% in Hungary down to 13% in the 
Slovak Republic, 6% in Romania, and 4% in Russia. The data in table 3 are based on 
annual wage and salary amounts and on total per capita labour costs in the 
automotive industry, i.e., the often proportionately higher white-collar salaries are 
                                            
12 The Journal Automotive News Europe already anticipates higher growth dynamics in the 
supplier sector, cf.: Chew, Edmund (2004): “The Expanded European Union: Low wages 
had lured suppliers to 5 countries already”, Automotive News Europe, May 03, 2004, 
autonews.com archive. On supplier outsourcing dynamics see also RolandBerger 
Strategy Consultants (2004) and Ebel, Bernhard; Utikal, Hannes; Hofer, Markus B. 
(2004): Trendstudie Zulieferer 2004, Simon Kucher and Partners.  
13 The American Chamber of Commerce in Poland (2004); http://www.amcham.com.pl/ai_ 
01_2004_9.phtml 
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included. Furthermore, these figures include payments like the "13th monthly salary" 
and the like, which, as often happens, are not taken into account in comparisons with 
hourly wages.  
Table 4: Indexed (Germany = 100) Yearly Wages/Salaries and Labour Costs 
per Person Employed in the European Automotive Industries 2003 
 Wages and Salaries 
Total Labour 
Costs 
Germany 100.0 100.0 
UK 75.9 69.9 
France 70.2 78.3 
Sweden 66.4 77.7 
Spain 55.6 59.5 
Italy 49.5 57.4 
Slovenia 23.2 – 
Hungary 20.3 22.0 
Poland 18.1 17.8 
Czech Republic 16.4 17.9 
Slovakia 12.9 13.9 
Romania 5.6 6.2 
Russia 4.0 – 
Source: VDA: International Auto Statistics, edition 2004, p. 350f., 361f.; own calculations. 
The average per-capita figure for wages and salaries in Germany was € 45,700; for 
total labour costs € 57,200. 
Table 5 shows the instance of German suppliers and their plans regarding new plants 
or expanded production and development capacities at new locations. The table 
shows that at the beginning of the current decade, Eastern Europe was playing just 
as great a role in new production capacity planning as Germany (East and West), 
and that medium term investment perspectives in the region already exceeded those 
in Germany. The same is true in the medium term for the establishment of production 
capacities in Asia. Table 4 also shows the – far weaker – increase in the importance 
of these location regions for research and development tasks.  
As we have seen, the combination of low-wage conditions and EU integration in 
CEE produces a special constellation which can undermine the previous win-win 
situation in relations between Western Europe and the Eastern European transition 
countries, through the rapid relocation of value-added resources and jobs to the 
detriment of the industrial countries.  
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Table 5: Plans of German Suppliers to Expand Production and Development 
Capacities at New Locations, Short and Medium Term 
 short term 
2001-2006 
medium term 
2006-2011 
 Production 
% 
Development 
% 
Production 
% 
Development 
% 
BRD – old federal states 15,8 27,1 9,6 29,0 
BRD – new federal states 7,3 7,5 5,1 6,5 
Europe 10,3 9,8 8,8 11,2 
Eastern Europe 21,8 8,3 20,6 9,3 
Russia 1,2 0,0 6,6 1,9 
North America 14,5 14,3 10,3 10,3 
South America 5,5 3,0 8,1 2,8 
Asia 13,9 8,3 18,4 10,3 
Others 0,6 0,0 1,5 0,0 
not planned 9,1 21,8 11,0 18,7 
Source: Dudenhöffer et al. (2002): Gemeinschaftsstudie Automobilstandort Deutschland, 
p. 17-18 
Summary 
The automotive industry remains one of the strongest German industries and the 
main pillar of the German export success – so far, it seems to be the best proof of the 
competitiveness of the “German model”. Under this surface, however, there are im-
portant changes that should be noted.  
Continued off-shoring of production to Eastern European countries is taking 
place, and this exerts considerable pressure on work and employment models in the 
automobile industry. Several of the concessions made by trade unions in the last 
years (2004-05) were enforced by relocation threats: Mercedes considered shifting 
production to South Africa, Opel to Sweden and Poland, Volkswagen to Portugal and 
the Czech Republic. The stagnating demand in the mass market segment and the 
fierce productivity competition in both the mass market and the premium market seg-
ment exert high pressure on employment.  
To date, the works councils and the IG Metall succeeded to deal with this pres-
sure by means of company-level employment pacts to defend the “German model” of 
employment relationships. The dynamics of outsourcing and off-shoring certainly 
unleash new pressures, but they do not necessarily result in the collapse of the exist-
ing industry-wide collective bargaining structures. The labour union and works-
council system, with the help of the social-democratic governments, managed to limit 
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the use of precarious employment forms and to regulate the deployment of agency 
work.  
However, the situation resembles a powder keg. The difficulties facing enter-
prises such as Volkswagen or General Motors in combination with high productivity 
increases in all segments of the industry could soon necessitate employment reduc-
tions of a dimension that could signal a break with former governance compromises. 
Can the actors at the enterprise level find solutions that would avoid such a break? 
Do the measures differ between Germany-based enterprises like Volkswagen and 
American-led companies like GM? And how do suppliers react?  
4.2 Telecommunications equipment industry 
“Siemens buys itself off from the mobile phone business” (FTD, 7.6.2005) or “Sie-
mens to shed sagging phone unit” (NYT, 8.6.2005) – these were the headlines an-
nouncing the sale of the German Siemens group’s mobile phone division to the Tai-
wanese BenQ. Does the exit of Siemens from the mobile phone business confirm the 
longstanding critique of the factors constraining the competitiveness of Germany’s 
telecommunication industry? Is the “varieties” approach right to claim that employ-
ment relationships in “coordinated market economies” like Germany create barriers 
to the development of “radically innovative” enterprises and industries? 
Let us briefly review developments in the German telecom equipment industry 
during the last decade. The general figures do not suggest a particular weakness of 
the sector. Over the ten years, the telecommunications equipment industry in Ger-
many experienced rapid growth. Between 1996 and 2002, the turnover of the produc-
tion of telecom equipment climbed from 14.5 to 20.0 billions euros. While the export 
ratio in output reached 28% in 1995, it rose to 51% in 2003 (Statistisches Bundes-
amt, Fachserie 4.1.1.). The employment in the telecommunications equipment indus-
try increased from 73,000 in 1996 to about 75,000 in 2003.14 Many of the global 
players in the telecommunications equipment industry have affiliates in Germany. 
Alcatel (5,600 employees in Germany), Nokia (3,500 employees), Motorola (2,800 
employees) and Lucent (500 employees) have both product development and pro-
duction facilities, and Ericsson has a large development centre employing 800 peo-
ple. However, by far most important are the production and development sites of 
Siemens. In 2004, Siemens Communications employed about 60,000 persons 
worldwide and about 27,000 in Germany – that is, one third of the total employment 
in the German production of telecommunications equipment (Siemens 2004). 
It is quite difficult to estimate the telecommunications-related employment in 
supplier enterprises because most of the suppliers do not work exclusively for the 
telecommunications sector. Between 1996 and 2003, employment in the most impor-
                                            
14 Employment is concentrated in a few big enterprises: In 2002, 76% of all employees of 
the telecom OEMs worked for ten enterprises with more than 1,000 employees. Small 
enterprises with less than 100 employees made up only about 5% of the employment 
(Statistisches Bundesamt, Fachserie 4.3.). 
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tant group of suppliers, the producers of electronic components, rose from 67,000 to 
72,000 in Germany.15  
When ranked by employment, Germany is the most important location of the 
telecommunications equipment industry in Europe, closely followed by France. Swe-
den and Finland; the two Nordic countries with a very successful telecommunications 
equipment industry have lower absolute numbers in both the production of electronic 
components and the production of end products, but the relative importance of the 
telecommunications industry is higher than in Germany given their much smaller 
overall labour force. It is noteworthy that Finland reaches the same level of turnover 
in telecommunications equipment production as Germany with a much lower number 
of employees (see table 6).  
While in the European context, the employment figures and the turnover suggest 
that the German telecommunications equipment industry is rather strong, comparison 
with the U.S. and Japan yields a more cautious assessment. In 2002, employment in 
the production of telecom equipment in Germany was 2.5 times lower than in the 
U.S. and 3.5 times lower than in Japan. The turnover of the German telecom equip-
ment industry did not reach but a quarter of the U.S. The differences are even 
greater in the production of electronic components: In 2002, the German industry 
reached a sixth of the American and a tenth of the Japanese employment. The U.S. 
electronic components industry’s turnover exceeded the German by ten times. 
Even if German telecom equipment industry does not reach the strength of the 
U.S. or of Japan, it would still appear to be a strong player in Europe. Behind the 
general figures, however, are obvious signs of weakness. The German flagship com-
pany Siemens has just divested its mobile phones business, which until recently has 
been regarded as one of its core areas. What role did labour regulation play in this 
development? More generally, what changes can be observed in the area of em-
ployment relations in this industry? 
In the following we discuss the development of the German telecommunications 
equipment industry taking the example of Siemens Communications, the telecommu-
nications equipment and services division. The analysis is based primarily on publicly 
available data and the secondary literature, as our own empirical research on this 
industry has just begun. The first reason for basing our discussion of the Siemens 
case is that it is quite well documented. The second and more important reason is 
the flagship role of Siemens in the German telecommunications industry. Siemens is 
a classic example of the “Modell Deutschland”: As a member of the metal industry’s 
employers association, its labour regulation follows the collective agreement stan-
dards; a powerful works council system from shop floor to the corporate level exists; 
and traditionally, employment security has been regarded as a basic principle of per-
sonnel policy. With this strong tradition of “social partnership”, Siemens differs from 
 
                                            
15  Employment is less concentrated than in the production of end products. In 2002, 54% 
of all persons employed in this supplier industry worked for large enterprises with more 
than 1,000 employees. Small enterprises with less than 100 employees made up about 
11% of the industry (Statistisches Bundesamt, Fachserie 4.3.). 
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the average of the German telecommunication industry, in which only about half of 
the employees are covered by works councils.16 The strength of trade unions at Sie-
mens (i.e. IG Metall), however, does not really diverge from the general pattern in the 
infocom industry. The rate of trade union membership at Siemens amounts to 26% 
(industry average: 10% varying between 50% at production plants and 5% at white-
collar sites (Martens 2005: 55). We will see how the work and employment model at 
Siemens changes. 
Outsourcing and Off-shoring – Siemens on the way out of Germany? 
Siemens began its efforts to become a global player in the telecommunications 
equipment industry at the end of the 1980s in the context of the liberalisation of tele-
communications markets. A wave of acquisitions and joint ventures lead to rapid ex-
pansion of the two main product divisions of Siemens Communications: the produc-
tion of mobile phones and the production of network infrastructure for network opera-
tors and other enterprises. The production of mobile phones was concentrated in 
three locations: the German plants in Bocholt and Kamp-Lintfort, and the Chinese 
plant in Shanghai. The production of network infrastructure remained distributed in a 
large network of about 30 sites (Dörrenbächer 1999). 
Despite the continued efforts to establish itself as one of the leading telecom 
equipment producers, the mobile telephone branch became the biggest worry of 
Siemens. Siemens’ world market share in mobile telephones oscillated around 8% 
over the previous years, fell to 7.2% in 2004 and reached 5.5% in the first quarter of 
2005 (FTD, 5.6.2005), and was far from reaching the share of 15% required for a 
profitable production, according to von Pierer, the former chief executive of Siemens 
(FTD, 31.7.2003). Siemens has had more success in the production of network infra-
structure. Here, the enterprise reached a world market share of 13% in 2003 and 
even 23% in the market for UMTS-network infrastructure (http://www.inside-
handy.de/news/1269.html, download 7.3.2005). In 2004, Siemens reported a 30% 
market share for UMTS-network solutions and was the worldwide leading equipment 
producer in this segment (Siemens 2005). 
Due to acquisitions and joint ventures, foreign employment increased but Sie-
mens’ employment in Germany remained stable, as table 7 illustrates. The situation 
of the Siemens Communications division did not differ from the whole group. With 
27,000 employees, the Communications division in Germany represented 44% of 
Siemens total employment in Germany in 2004, making it the largest division in terms 
of employment. Table 7 illustrates the size of Siemens Communication division’s em-
ployment in Germany as compared with the size of its workforce in Asia, the Mecca 
for the production of electronics. The 8,500 Asian employees of Siemens Communi-
cations constituted 14% of the division’s total employment.  
Table 6 also shows the development of employment at Infineon and Epcos, two 
important suppliers of the telecom equipment industry and former subsidiaries of 
                                            
16  Available information about union membership and collective bargaining relates to the 
infocom industry as a whole, there are no data on the telecom equipment segment. 
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Siemens. Infineon, a producer of semiconductors, makes over 30% of its turnover in 
the telecom equipment industry and maintains anchored to Germany, even if Asian 
locations gain in importance. In 2004, 46% of Infineon’s total employment was lo-
cated in Germany. Important changes were announced in 2005, however. Infineon 
announced that it would sell its memory unit, which was in deficit, and concentrate on 
electronics for the automotive industry. Its sale to a foreign investor could put at risk 
up to 4,500 jobs in Germany (one fourth of employment in Germany), according to 
the IG Metall (Handelsblatt, 23.9.2005).  
The situation is different at Epcos, a producer of electronic components. Epcos 
makes about one third of its turonover in the telecom equipment industry. The share 
of German employment at Epcos fell within four years from 28% to 14% while the 
share of employment in Asia doubled. The relocation to low-wage countries is a 
stated strategy of Epcos (Epcos 2004). 
Table 7: Siemens, Infineon, and Epcos – Employment in Germany and Asia  
(in thsd. and in % of total employment) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Siemens Germany (%) 
 Asia (%) 
167 (40%)
36 (  9%)
181 (40%)
44 (10%)
175 (41%)
43 (10%)
170 (41%) 
44 (11%) 
164 (38%)
52 (12%)
Infineon Germany (%) 
 Asia (%) 
14 (49%)
9 (30%)
17 (50%)
9 (25%)
16 (52%)
7 (24%)
16 (50%) 
8 (25%) 
16 (46%)
10 (29%)
Epcos Germany (%) 
 Asia (%) 
4 (28%)
3 (26%)
4 (28%)
4 (30%)
3 (21%)
5 (35%)
2 (17%) 
5 (40%) 
2 (14%)
7 (46%)
Siemens without Infineon and Epcos. Source: Annual reports 
Since the beginning of this decade, Siemens intensified its efforts in outsourcing and 
off-shoring. In 2000, Siemens made a step already taken by other OEMs (cf. Lüthje, 
Schumm, Sproll 2002): It outsourced the production of 33 mn mobile phones until 
2003 to the contract manufacturer Flextronics (Electronic News, 8.7.2000) – this vol-
ume corresponded to one year of production i.e. one third of total production between 
2001 and 2003. The Flextronics plant in Hungary took over the production. 
Relocation threats have started to shape the collective bargaining at Siemens. In 
2003, Siemens announced that it would shift a large part of its software development 
to Eastern Europe. At the time, the company employed about 50,000 software devel-
opers: 30,000 in Germany, 2,700 in Eastern Europe, and the rest in Western Europe, 
North America and Asia (FTD, 12.12.2003). The announcement clearly portended a 
massive relocation of jobs from Germany to its Eastern neighbours. 
The next step was that the relocation threat became part of the general policy of 
the company. In 2004, Siemens presented the “Siemens Management System” 
(SMS) that was perceived as a means to relocate workplaces to low-wage countries 
(see the statement of the Siemens group works council/Positionspapier GBR/KBR 
2004). The SMS linked the employment of Siemens in different world regions to their 
turnover and value added share. At this time, 38% of Siemens’s employees worked 
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in Germany while the share of turnover in Germany was 23%. The SMS provided for 
three projects: The relocation of production to low-wage countries (“worldwide manu-
facturing concept”), the centralisation of internal services from different sites (“shared 
services”), and the relocation of software development to low-wage countries (“soft-
ware initiative”). 
In 2004, several conflicts broke out. Some commentators spoke of a “turning 
point in the history of the enterprise” (FTD, 19.11.2002). Siemens announced the re-
location of the production from different plants (Bocholt, Kamp-Lintfort, Bruchsal, 
Kirchheim/Teck, Nürnberg) to Eastern Europe and China. These plans were re-
scinded only after wage and working time concessions were made by IG Metall. 
However, all the trade union concessions that Siemens secured in 2004 could 
not prevent the failure and eventual sale of the mobile phones division in 2005. Sie-
mens was so eager to get rid itself of mobile phone production that in summer 2005 it 
transferred this business area for free to the Taiwanese contract manufacturer and 
telecom equipment producer BenQ. Siemens even provided most of the financing for 
BenQ’s purchase of the division by itself acquiring 50 mn. € of BenQ shares. Soon 
after the takeover of the Siemens mobile phones production by BenQ in summer 
2005, the Taiwanese enterprise announced a reduction of mobile phone production 
in Germany (ap, 16.6.2005). 
Due to the high degree of standardisation in production processes of the electri-
cal goods and telecommunications industry, outsourcing and off-shoring is an easy 
step to take (Jürgens and Rehbehn 2004). The relocation of production to Eastern 
Europe or China signifies a withdrawal from the German model of labour regulation. 
This withdrawal leads to a high pressure to lower labour costs and to change labour 
regulation in Germany, especially for production and assembly workers. In the follow-
ing, we discuss recent changes in the work and employment models at Siemens un-
der the pressure of the relocation threat. 
The decline of solidarity? New forms of flexibility and shrinking 
employment protection 
Employment protection belongs to the core elements of the German work and em-
ployment model. As was already mentioned, Siemens has had a long tradition of pro-
viding stable long-term employment protection. Employees were seen by the com-
pany, and they saw themselves, as members of the “Siemens family”. And even in 
times of difficulties no member of this family was let down. In cases of difficulties 
early retirement games and the use flexible working time and other measures were 
used to reduce labour in a consensual, socially acceptable manner. Since the end of 
the 1990s, however, the enterprise increased its efforts to gain new sources of flexi-
bility. The main measures taken are the following: 
– Demands for wage and working time concessions in exchange for continued 
employment protection. After an intense conflict in summer 2004, Siemens se-
cured an extension of the weekly working time in its two main German telecom 
equipment production plants in Kamp-Lintfort and Bocholt from 35 to 40 hours 
with no extra pay; combined with a reduction of bonus pay, this led to a reduction 
  – 37 – 
of hourly wage costs by 30%. In exchange for this concession, Siemens gave an 
employment guarantee for the workers in these two plants just for two years, i.e. 
until summer 2006. A similar compromise was reached in autumn 2004 for the 
plant in Bruchsal.  
In addition, Siemens tries to use plain dismissals as a flexibility instrument. In 
2002, a conflict broke out as Siemens announced to dismiss 2,600 of its 7,300 
white-collar employees at the Munich site (development site for telecom network 
infrastructure) (see Martens 2005: 95ff.). Although the trade union membership 
was low (about 6%), a grass root organisation developed. The works council and 
the self-organised employees mobilised massive protests. Finally Siemens 
agreed not to dismiss more than 1,100 persons and to offer to the dismissed a 
change to a “job creation company” (Beschäftigungsgesellschaft) for one year. 
“Job creation companies” are institutions that offer skill training programmes and 
arranging employment for workers who are on short-time work contracts or faced 
with unemployment. Their use allows to circumvent the social selection criteria 
for redundancies and to benefit from a public co-financing for so called short-time 
work. This company attempts to find new jobs for the concerned employees. 
While 400 employees transferred to the “job creation company,” a further 350 re-
fused and were dismissed. However, the German labour regulation still makes it 
difficult and particularly expensive to push dismissals through against the works 
council. In the case of the redundancies in Munich, the works council took legal 
action for 200 of the dismissed employees and won most of the suits at the in-
dustrial court. 
– The segmentation of employment conditions. In order to create different regula-
tion areas within the enterprise and to redistribute the burdens of flexibility, Sie-
mens negotiated supplementary collective agreements for parts of the enter-
prise. In 2002, for instance, a conflict about the future of the service units in the 
Siemens network section broke out. After the management announced dismiss-
als, the works council and the IG Metall made a new proposal for an agreement 
for the service unit that was finally accepted by the management. Siemens and 
the IG Metall agreed to transfer the 6,500 employees from the metalworking col-
lective agreement into a collective agreement for services. This meant lower 
wages and higher working time flexibility for the employees. 
– Agency work – Siemens and its subsidiaries increasingly use temporary work as 
a flexibility buffer in production. In some plants like the Infineon works in Dres-
den, temporary workers represent about 30% of the workforce. The trade unions 
lack effective levers to control the use and the spreading of temporary work. 
Like Volkswagen, Siemens has created an own temporary work agency called 
KompTime. According to the IG Metall, KompTime recruits personnel from the 
“job creation companies” of Siemens and lends them back to Siemens.  
– While the role of temporary work increases in production, fixed-term employment 
contracts increase among white-collar employees. About 5-10% of all employees 
in the infocom industry have fixed-term contracts. In contrast to previous prac-
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tices,even new recruits from universities often get fixed-term contracts (interview 
telecom D1, 21.2.2005).  
– Contract manufacturers serve as a flexibility buffer. Siemens has outsourced a 
large part of its production to Flextronics since 2001. With the exception of plants 
taken over from OEMs, the production sites of contract manufacturers are lo-
cated in low-wage countries. The low wages and the flexible employment condi-
tions exert strong pressure on the remaining sites in high-wage countries like 
Germany.  
Increasing inequality? Organisation-centred and market-centred 
incentive systems 
In the case of Siemens, the “Ten-Point-Program” of 1998 signifies an important step 
in the restructuring of incentive systems. It was presented on the eve of the com-
pany’s listing on the New York Stock Exchange. Apart from measures designed to 
transform its business portfolio and management instruments, it contained a shift 
from organisation-centred to market-centred incentive systems. For about 500 execu-
tives, 40% of the salary is fixed, the other 60% depends on the achievement of prof-
itability objectives defined for each business segment. Since 1999, Siemens has in-
troduced two stock option programmes for its executives. As to the upper-level white 
collar employees (außertarifliche Angestellte), a system of differentiated individual-
ised incentives based on target agreements has been introduced. 
The changes for white-collar employees can be illustrated with two examples 
from companies other than Siemens. T-Mobile, the Deutsche Telekom subsidiary 
established in 1993, is a good example of the introduction of target agreements 
(Bender 2000). The firm agreement signed in 1997 distinguishes three salary com-
ponents: a basic part, a monthly performance-based bonus, and an annual bonus 
related to the fulfilment of an individual target agreement. The monthly performance-
based bonus is subject to standardised criteria and was introduced as a concession 
to the trade union. According to Bender (2000: 172), the management perceives the 
annual individualised bonus as the most important part of its incentive system. The 
individual target agreements are settled annually in a two month top-down procedure 
from the executive board down to the lowest hierarchy level.  
Interestingly, an agreement between DaimlerChrysler’s services division and IG 
Metall had a pilot function for the introduction of new pay systems in the infocom in-
dustry. According to this agreement for rank-and-file employees of Debis, Daimler-
Chysler’s IT services company, paid an annual bonus depending on the achievement 
of an individual target agreement and on the financial results of the enterprise (Lücke 
and Gutbrod 2002: 407). This annual bonus amounted to 10-20% of the annual in-
come. For non-pay scale employees, the annual bonus was higher and the calcula-
tion more complex. The annual individual bonus for a unit manager, for instance, 
could reach 40% of the annual income as the maximum (Deller 2002: 414). In 2001, 
Debis was taken over by Deutsche Telekom and integrated into its T-Systems 
branch. In the following year, the union ver.di concluded a collective agreement for 
the employees of T-Systems International (TSI). In the new wage system, variable 
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wage components amount to 10% - 30%. Employees can individually agree upon 
higher variable remuneration components. 
Summary 
The balance of power between trade unions and enterprises in the telecommunica-
tions equipment industry differs from the automotive industry. Changes in employ-
ment relations have been accelerating and deepening in recent years. The collective 
bargaining system has become more and more decentralised, agency work expands 
further, and redundancies begin to play an increasingly important role as a flexibility 
instrument. Siemens, as the flagship company in the industry, has been playing a 
lead role in publicly criticising the consensus-based character and job-security orien-
tation of German employment relations. In the telecommunications equipment indus-
try, there are indications of a break with the “Model Deutschland”.  
There are several causes of this change. One of them is the relative weakness of 
trade unions. The second cause may be found in the high level of standardisation in 
production processes allowing for fast shifts of production capacities to low-wage 
countries. The plausible threat of closing production sites in Germany exerts pressure 
on the social compromise of the “institutionalised high-wage economy” (Streeck 
1995: 2) in Germany.  
Many questions remain open, however. Is the failure of Siemens – the core of 
the telecommunications equipment industry in Germany – really due to the “German 
model”? Several economic analysts have pointed to the fact that Siemens failed to 
anticipate important market trends in the mobile phone market like built-in cameras 
and flip-phones, and lagged behind market leaders like Nokia in the technological 
development (Handelsblatt, 6.6.2005; interview telecom D2, 10.6.05). How success-
fully do other enterprises of the German telecom equipment industry develop?  
4.3 Video games industry 
The video games industry is one of the fastest growing industries worldwide and a 
significant part of the entertainment sector. The value of world market leaders in this 
industry like Electronic Arts or Nintendo reaches or even exceeds the value of tradi-
tional German industry giants like Volkswagen. In 2005, the stock market value of 
Electronic Arts was 19.4 $ bn, while the value of Volkswagen amounted to 18 $ bn 
(Teipen 2006: 15). The recent costly efforts of Microsoft to enter the video games 
market and establish its own game platform illustrate the increasing attractiveness of 
the video games industry.  
The German video games industry is not among the globally leading actors in 
this sector. Four segments can be differentiated in the value chain of the video 
games industry: The developers of video games and the publishers constitute the two 
core segments. Upstream of them on the value chain are supplier firms for software, 
sound effects, graphics, and animation, and downstream are the retail stores. In 
2004, 70 development firms and 31 publishers existed in Germany. There were about 
6,000 employees in the entertainment software segment (interview games D2, 
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10.12.2004). If we add the so-called edutainment segment (learning software), the 
industry has maximally 10,000 employees. If we extend the definition and count even 
advertisement agencies et al., the video games industry would have 19,000 employ-
ees altogether (ibid.). Statements about the amount of game developers among the 
employees vary between 500 and 3,000. 
Most employees in Germany work in marketing and distribution departments in 
branch offices of foreign enterprises or in small development firms. There are hardly 
any globally successful German publishing and development firms. Neither do the 
global market leaders entertain development locations in Germany. The German 
publishers and developers concentrate almost exclusively on the German market; 
German productions do not play any role outside of Germany. But even in Germany, 
the market share of German publishers and developers is only 5-8% (interview 
games D2, 10.12.2004). Most development companies are extremely small – 5-10 
employees is the average firm size of German development studios (interview games 
D1, 15.11.2004). This weakness in development contrasts with the huge importance 
of the German user market for video games. After the U.S., Japan and Great Britain, 
Germany is the third-largest national market in the world.  
Table 8: Employees in the video games industry in 200017 
 Video games industry altogether Developers 
USA 
Great Britain  
Germany 
France 
Spain 
Italy 
Scandinavia 
Benelux 
about 43,000 
about 20,000 
about 19,000 
about 15,000 
about 11,000 
about 11,000 
about 8,000 
about 9,000 
n.s. 
6,000 
580 
2,620 
300 
200 
900 
500 
Source: Spectrum (2002: 21/22) 
The dismal international position of German developers and publishers is weakening 
further as consoles gain importance against the segment of PC-based games. In the 
global market, the segment of consoles already plays a more important role than the 
computer segment. Two Japanese and one American company control the console 
platforms, and consequently the access to the console games market: Sony (Play-
                                            
17  To account for the importance of the industry as an employer, the indirect employment 
effects would have to be calculated in. For the USA, IDSA (2001) estimates direct and 
indirect employment effects of the video games industry at 124,500 jobs in the general 
IT industry and 219,000 jobs in the national economy altogether. This means that the 
employment generated by the video games industry exceeds by five times the employ-
ment in the industry itself. 
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station 1 and 2), Nintendo (GameCube, Gameboy Advanced), and Microsoft (Xbox). 
In the German market, however, the dominance of the console segment is delayed 
(VUD 2004: 41). German producers of video games still focus on PC-platforms which 
offer open standards and open access to the market, but which have smaller and 
smaller market shares in the world market. The global market for the development of 
entertainment software is dominated by US American, Japanese and British enter-
prises – other nations follow only at a very large distance. 
Table 9: Market share of different platforms in the entertainment software 
market in 2003 
Consoles 
Platform PC PS2 PS1* GC GBA XBox Oth-
ers* 
Global market share  
Market share in Ger-
many 
19% 
50% 
44% 
24% 
– 
5% 
10% 
  6% 
11% 
  7% 
11% 
  6% 
5% 
2% 
Source: DFC 2004; VUD 2004. * For the global market share PS1 is counted under “others”. 
A recent development in the field of hardware platforms could play in the hands of 
German producers: The mobile phone is catching on as a new mobile game platform, 
along with the Gameboy by Nintendo (interview games D3, 20.12.2004). As mobile 
phone games need comparatively low development and personnel expenses, this 
could be a possibility for developers in Germany to regain market shares. But this is 
only a dim hope on the horizon at this moment. 
What explains the weak position of the German video games industry? Do work 
and employment models provide an explanation? Does the example of the video 
games industry illustrate the incompatibility of “new economy” industries and the 
“German model,” as the “varieties” approach suggests? 
The decline of solidarity? Flexibility and employment protection  
According to the “varieties“ approach, the German economy is characterised by a 
high level of employment protection that makes fast organisational change and modi-
fications of the competence profile of enterprises difficult and hampers the “creative 
destruction” required in the “new economy”. The situation in the German video 
games industry contradicts this diagnosis. Surely, the video games industry is not an 
example of a successful “new Economy” sector in Germany. This weakness, how-
ever, is not linked to limited organisational and employment flexibility – the factors 
emphasized in the “varieties” approach. Employment flexibility of development com-
panies is very high. At development firms, staffing level of permanent employees is 
on the short side and is completed by fixed-term recruitments or freelancers if re-
quired (interview games D2, 10.12.2004). Typically only members of the core teams 
have regular employment contracts. While fixed-term contracts play a central role as 
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flexibility buffers, there is no agency work in the industry. Employment security of de-
velopers often depends on the success of a single game, because companies are 
frequently too small to develop several projects simultaneously.  
The situation in publishing companies is somewhat different. Managerial em-
ployees of publishers have fixed-term contracts, which are often signed for a time of 
two or three years (interview games D3, 20.12.2004), but for marketing and sales as 
well as for clerical staff permanent employment contracts are prevailing in the pub-
lishing companies. However, the commitment to specific products is low and the fluc-
tuation between functions and companies is high. Employees tend to switch between 
companies in search of better wage conditions or career positions.  
The acceptance of the low level of employment security can be explained above 
all by the high importance of intrinsic work motivation and individual opportunities for 
self-realization in the work. The attractiveness of the video games industry arises nei-
ther from wage incentives nor from long term employment or career perspectives. 
The love for gaming and the possibility to transform a hobby into a job is an important 
source of motivation that most employees in development firms see as compensation 
for low job security and wages (Interview games D3, 20.12.2004).  
Increasing inequality? Organisation-centred and market-centred 
incentive systems  
Contrary to the Silicon Valley version of the “New Economy Business Model” (La-
zonick 2005), a compensation for low job security by strong monetary incentives 
does not exist, at least in development firms. In these small firms, variable bonuses 
play a minor role. It is the content of the work that forms the core of the incentive 
structure. Game development derives its attractiveness from the fact that it offers a 
high level of autonomy in organizing work and of the absence of standardised or hi-
erarchically structured work. Some small businesses try to imitate organisational 
structures of large scale companies. However, these attempts are rare because of 
the small firm sizes and the missing management know-how of the employees (inter-
view games D2, 10.12.2004). 
The situation is different in publishing enterprises. Variable wage components for 
managers amount for up to 50% of their pay and 25% for lower-level employees (in-
terview games D3, 20.12.2004). A bonus is usually paid if employees meet individual 
target agreements. These targets refer to turnover figures, costs and returns, and are 
determined for the whole company, for single departments and for individual func-
tions. This is all the more the case as the parent companies of most publishing firms 
are affiliates of foreign companies. The latter may explain also the widespread appli-
cation of performance evaluation and target systems even in the case of low level 
jobs. An orientation towards performance targets belongs to the typical management 
culture of these companies. The nature of the guidelines varies, however, from com-
pany to company.  
All global players in the industry, and the two stock exchange-listed German pub-
lishers, offer stock options to employees. However, while stock option plans of lead-
ing American firms cover most of the employees and are the main financing instru-
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ment of the enterprises, the stock option plans of German publishers are much 
smaller and restricted to the top managerial staff. 
Professionalisation and the vocational training system 
The so called “dual” vocational education system is one of the main pillars of German 
work and employment models. It is interesting that to this point, the system has not 
managed to develop vocational education adequate for the video games industry. 
The existing apprenticeship profiles of media designers and graphical designers are 
not well evaluated by development firms. “Self-made” people dominate among em-
ployees – the majority without formal qualifications –, who can be divided into com-
puter specialists, graphical designers and generally “creative” people. 95% of the 
employees enter the companies without a formal university degree and pass an in-
ternship there. Most of these lateral hires have a high-school diploma (Abitur), but 
they have often dropped out of university (interview games D2, 10.12.2004). Charac-
teristic competencies consist of a mixture between knowledge of computers and 
creativity (interview games D3, 20.12.2004). 
Educational institutions for employees have begun to emerge only recently. 
Since 2003, the university in Magdeburg has a chair dealing explicitly with entertain-
ment software in the faculty of informatics. A university of applied sciences (Iserlohn) 
offers study modules about management in the entertainment software production. 
Besides, the Game Academy in Berlin offers vocational training for game developers 
(interview games D2, 10.12.2004). Compared to the situation we found in Sweden, 
these efforts to organize training and create job profiles come rather late.  
The lack of adequate vocational education and the absence of clear career pat-
terns seem to result in the very low labour market attractiveness of the video games 
industry. The work force consists primarily of video games enthusiasts, and the or-
ganisation and management of video games development firms exhibits low levels of 
professionalisation. In contrast to related industries like the media industry, it has not 
generated any industry-wide “sets of rules and resources” (Windeler and Sydow 
2001: 1051). At most there are informal standards about wage levels, working times 
and typical careers.  
In contrast, clearly outlined job profiles are common in publishing companies. 
Most of the jobs here, however, are not video-game specific. Marketing and sales 
employees make up 75% of the staff. The importance of university graduates in the 
field of managerial positions is increasing, but commercial apprenticeship training is 
more widespread in these functions (interview games D3, 20.12.2004). In contrast to 
developer firms, where standardised professional paths do not exist, typical promo-
tion prospects in publisher companies can be outlined. Having obtained a marketing 
degree, a typical career path leads from the position of a junior product manager (be-
ing in charge of single products, but under the control of a senior product manager) 
to the senior product manager (being independently in charge of single products) and 
to the marketing director of a company, who has an executive function for product 
managers (interview games D3, 20.12.2004). 
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Work organisation in developer firms is project-oriented with little degree of stan-
dardisation. Work processes mostly reflect an absence of hierarchies, but specialisa-
tions concerning different jobs have already emerged. On average, a project leader 
guides a team of 10 to 15 employees: 2 to 3 programmers, 3 to 5 graphic designers, 
a game designer, a level designer, and if necessary temporary workers for manuals 
and similar responsibilities. When compared with the production of television or cin-
ema films, development of games takes a course which is less formal and planned: A 
“trial and error” procedure dominates. This open development process can be re-
garded as a precondition for bringing the creative potential of the employees into 
play. However, it simultaneously creates a high risk, too, since delivering results on 
time is the decisive basis for success in video game development.  
It is not yet clear how the lack of industry-wide vocational education standards in-
fluences labour mobility vis-à-vis other knowledge or creative industries. Many analy-
ses of labour markets in Silicon Valley stress the importance of labour mobility and 
exchange between different forms of companies and different industries (Benner 
2002: 49). From first interviews conducted in the video games industry it seems that 
the exchange of labour with other industries is rather low. If this proves the case, one 
could argue that despite the absence of management commitments to employment 
protection, the efficiency of the labour market is hampered by the lack of vocational 
education standards and the low level of professionalisation – a situation that limits 
the access of companies to the “right” employees. 
Equality and inequality of wage and employment conditions in the 
industry 
The weak position of German publishers and developers in the global competition 
leads to a high inequality of risk distribution, and as a consequence, also of employ-
ment conditions between different types of firms. The global players in the video 
games industry are generally characterized by a high degree of vertical integration: 
They have their own development studios and cover all main steps of the value chain 
from development to distribution. German publishers do not have the resources to 
manage the risks of such an integration strategy and mostly respond to high competi-
tive pressure by outsourcing development, and with it, the financial risks to inde-
pendent firms. The position of these small development companies vis-à-vis the pub-
lishers is very weak, and contract conditions are extremely unfavourable. Contracts 
are said to be a “farce”, since independent development firms have no choice than to 
sign them due to their own financial weakness. As a rule, development companies 
can only cover their costs during the development time and the following months by 
their proceeds. Profit sharing is very rare (interview games D2, 10.12.2004). There is 
little indication of trust and orientation toward long-term relationship between firms in 
the value chain.  
The weak bargaining position of small developer firms is strategically perpetu-
ated by publishing companies. Publishers often cooperate with a team of developers 
for the development of maximally two games and afterwards look for new coopera-
tion partners – unless these manage to win an exceptional hit. Although long-term 
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cooperation would potentially be more advantageous in terms of efficiency, most pub-
lishers prefer to avoid extended cooperation because this kind of relational depend-
ence would enable developers to make higher demands as well. As publishers pos-
sess market rights to the games, they can change the developer team even in the 
case of a market success. The relatively low technological level of games being pro-
duced in Germany makes it particularly easy to change development teams. 
The unfavourable contract conditions between publishers and developers make 
the growth of development companies very difficult. Their small financial assets limit 
the recruitment of more employees and prevent companies from building up ade-
quate personnel resources, which would be necessary for more complex develop-
ment projects. Hardly any German development company reaches the critical mass 
to be internationally competitive in the field of demanding and complex games. One 
can already foresee that this weak competitive position will deteriorate further. For 
example, it is likely that no independent German development company will get li-
censes for the development of a game based on the next version of Sony’s Play-
station console, which is expected to enter the market in 2006/07. Sony cooperates 
only with firms having at least 100 employees in development and enough experi-
ence with older Playstation variants – conditions that apply to hardly any German 
development company. Due to a lack of resources, German developers seem to be 
locked in an underdeveloped state with low growth prospects. 
While the publishers pass on the financial risks to development firms, there are 
only a few tasks that can be outsourced by the latter. Programming and game design 
are the absolute core components of in-house development. However, activities like 
graphics or music can be outsourced and outsourcing is more and more common. 
This is how development costs can be reduced, because graphical designers need 
not to be employed during the whole time a game is being developed.  
Off-shoring to low-wage countries and in particular to Eastern Europe remains 
limited. The skill levels needed for programming and other tasks surely do not exist in 
adequate supply in Eastern Europe. Two German publishers have already estab-
lished development studios in Poland and Slovakia but this is still the exception, as 
table 10 illustrates. While the publishers at least have the possibility to shift develop-
ment to low-wage countries, the capacity of independent German development firms 
to off-shore activities is very low due to their lack of resources. In addition, according 
to our interviews, German developers fear language and cultural problems (interview 
games D4, 21.1.2005).  
Table 10: Own development studios of leading German video games 
publishers (2005) 
Germany Western Europe Eastern Europe Asia 
6 2 2 (Poland, Slovakia) 1 (Singapore) 
Publishers: JoWooD, Sunflowers, Ascaron, 10tacle, Zuxxez 
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Finance and capital markets – an explanation for the weakness of 
German enterprises? 
At several points of the discussion above, we have touched upon the question of fi-
nancing conditions of the video games enterprises. It seems that this point is crucial 
to explain the weakness of the German video games industry. The duration of game 
development varies greatly, but it can be remarkably long. Simple, so-called casual 
games can be developed within six months. Complex top games take up between 
two and four years of development time. The costs of the development of quality 
games amount to several millions euros.  
During the last ten to fifteen years, the high and further growing costs of game 
development have initiated a wave of mergers and acquisitions in the global video 
games publishing sector. American and French publishers were particularly active in 
pursuing M&A, benefiting from the good financing opportunities in their national fi-
nance markets. This concentration process continued until today. In the particularly 
costly segment of console games, for instance, the fifteen largest publishers con-
trolled 92.3% of the world market in 2005 (DFC 2005). In Germany, 14 large compa-
nies generate 80% of the market’s turnover in Germany and the American goliath 
Electronic Arts alone has a market share of 23% (Welt am Sonntag, 9.5.2004). Sur-
prisingly, British companies could not convert the strong position of their country in 
the development market into success in the publisher market, whereas French pub-
lishers could narrow the gap to American market leaders even without a strong na-
tional base of developers. Larrue, Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2003) explain this with 
reference to the different financing conditions of the companies: The small interest of 
the British financial market in investments for companies publishing video games has 
led to a decline of British firms in the global market. 
The high level of concentration in the industry sets very high market entry 
thresholds, as can be illustrated with the example of the Austrian publisher JoWooD. 
JoWooD is the largest publisher in the German-speaking region and the most promi-
nent example of an attempt to catch up with the American, French, and Japanese 
Global Players. Since its IPO at the Vienna stock exchange in 2000, JoWooD was 
able to mobilise a capital inflow of 37 mn €. It was not enough.  
Table 11: Market entry threshold: A comparison between Electronic Arts and 
JoWooD  
 Electronic Arts JoWooD 
Published video games in 2004 
Marketing expenses per game in thsd. € (2004) 
Revenue per game in tsd. € (2004) 
43 
6,914 
56,300 
22 
76 
770 
Source: JoWooD (2005) 
Table 11 illustrates the financial power of JoWooD and of the American market 
leader Electronic Arts. In 2004, EA published 43 games, i.e. about two times more 
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than JoWooD. However, while EA disposed of a marketing budget of nearly 7 mn € 
per published title, JoWooD could spend 76,000 € on marketing per video game. The 
revenues differed accordingly: EA earned 56 mn € per game, i.e. 70 times more than 
JoWooD. 
The situation of small German development firms is even worse than that of the 
German publishers. Usually, they finance the development of a new game through 
the returns from the previous one. Therefore, each flop can endanger the future exis-
tence of a company (interview games D3, 20.12.2004). In contrast to other media 
areas, state subsidies do not play any role. Moreover, since the burst of the New 
Economy bubble in 2000/01 it has become even more difficult to receive bank credits 
or venture capital for the development of a game.  
Summary 
What factors explain the marginal role of German video game firms in the interna-
tional industry? Do questions of labour regulation play an important role? We have 
discussed findings from our research and pointed to a poor vocational training sys-
tem, the low attractiveness and transparency of the labour market for game develop-
ers, and the low level of professional management in the German video games in-
dustry. These problems surely hamper the development of the industry, but they are 
not rooted in the institutions, rules and practices of the German work and employ-
ment model. The lack of professionalisation and vocational training even suggests 
that a stronger inclusion into the traditional German vocational training system could 
support a better development of the German video games industry. We find voca-
tional training institutions in countries with a longer history of video games production 
like the USA or Japan but also in Sweden, where the development of the video 
games industry is a recent phenomenon (Teipen 2006: 51). In general, the video 
games industry seems to “ignore” the patterns of the German model and to follow the 
worldwide work and employment practices of “new economy” industries. Rather than 
in questions of work and employment, the weakness of the German video games 
industry seems to result from high market entry thresholds to late comers in this sec-
tor, and to unfavourable financing conditions of German enterprises. It is primarily 
this last point that touches on the question of incompatibility between the develop-
ment of the “new economy” and the German institutional and regulatory framework.  
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5. Summary and conclusions 
Summarising: Do we observe a break with the German employment model? We have 
discussed the question of a break with the “Modell Deutschland” in three industries 
and we saw considerable differences.  
In the automotive industry, the institutions and regulatory forms of the “Modell 
Deutschland” have remained in place. Employment protection maintains its high im-
portance, and working time flexibility and company-internal mobility remain the main 
flexibility resources of the personnel policy. New forms of flexibility like agency work 
are introduced but in a form controlled by works councils. Notwithstanding the stabil-
ity of company compromises, there are indications of deeper changes: Work time 
and wage concessions become more and more the price of employment guarantees. 
We expect these changes to be deeper at supplier enterprises than at the OEMs. But 
the situation resembles a powder keg. Stagnating demand, high productivity in-
creases and off-shoring exert increasing pressures on employment in Germany. Up 
to now, trade unions and works councils have succeeded in dealing with these pres-
sures but it is far from clear that the existing governance compromises can be sus-
tained into the future.   
The telecommunications equipment industry represents a contrasting case to the 
automotive industry. At a first glance, the “classical” institutions of labour regulation in 
Germany – works councils and industry-wide collective agreements – remain in place 
here, too. Due to the comparatively weaker position of trade unions and the threat or 
reality of relocation of production to low-wage countries, however, the company com-
promises on labour issues in the telecommunications industry differ from its automo-
tive counterpart. The core of “secure” employment relationships shrinks faster, pre-
carious employment forms like agency work and fixed-term contracts expand more 
rapidly. Siemens – the flagship of the German telecommunications equipment indus-
try – pursued a rather conflict-oriented policy towards trade unions in pushing for 
changes in the prevailing work and employment model.  
The video games industry, finally, is a sector where the usual forms of labour 
regulation in the “Modell Deutschland” are barely in evidence. This industry is charac-
terised by a sharp opposition between publishing and development enterprises. The 
core of regular employees in development enterprises is relatively small as compared 
to the broad “margin” of fixed-term employment relationships and freelancers. There 
are hardly any regulations regarding working times. Institutions like works councils 
and collective agreements do not exist. The small size of both the publishing and the 
development enterprises, coupled with employees’ individualistic and creative cul-
ture, specific qualifications, and strong identification with the work, result in govern-
ance compromises that differ from traditional industrial patterns. In particular, game 
developers appreciate the participation possibilities and the high autonomy offered by 
their work, and in turn accept the very high flexibility requirements. 
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In conclusion, we find similar trends but differences in patterns and pace of 
change in the automobile and in the telecommunications equipment industries. In 
both industries, opening clauses weaken the industry-wide agreements. In both in-
dustries, the employees have to accept wage reductions and increasing flexibility to 
maintain their employment security. In the telecommunications equipment industry, 
the outsourcing and off-shoring pressure is very strong and entails deeper changes in 
the balance of power between actors and of the contents of governance compro-
mises than in the automotive industry. In the latter, we have to differentiate between 
changes in work and employment at the OEMs and at supplier enterprises: While 
there are gradual changes at the OEMs at the top of the value chain, the pressure to 
lower work and wage standards and to shift production to low-cost countries is much 
higher for suppliers. The seeming stability, however, could be illusory and the fierce 
competition for stagnating markets could lead to break with former governance com-
promises even at the OEMS.  
Finally, the video games industry stands apart because the institutions of the 
German model have very limited applicability to this industry. Interestingly, the posi-
tion of the German video games industry is weaker than the other two, a fact which in 
any case cannot be explained by rigidities due to the traditional German employment 
model.  
But does this mean a break with the hitherto development path? Referring to the 
four elements of a potential break defined in the introduction, we can summarise our 
discussion as follows. The decentralisation of collective bargaining and the develop-
ment of company- and plant-level employment pacts points rather to a change than 
to a withdrawal from negotiation arenas of social partnership (e.g. the collective bar-
gaining system or the works councils). In contrast, several studies have put forward 
the argument that the off-shoring processes of German enterprises represent a with-
drawal from the German model of labour regulation, a “Modellflucht” (Bluhm 2001; 
Meardi and Toth 2005). The numerous “employment pacts” in the auto industry, 
however, are evidence that it is possible to reach governance compromises admit-
tedly with increasingly painful concessions from the labour side. In the telecom 
equipment industry even greater concessions have to be made and at the same time 
we observe indications of more radical breaks in the form of exit instead of voice evi-
denced by increased off-shoring. Table 12 summarises our findings of changes in 
work and employment relations in the three industries. 
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Table 12: Changing work and employment relations in German industries 
 Automotive industry Telecom equipment Video games industry 
Employment 
protection 
Still a vital part of gov-
ernance compromises 
but becomes increas-
ingly “expensive” in 
terms of wage/work 
time concessions and 
restricted to a core 
group of employees 
Similar to automotive, 
compromises – here, 
however, more fragile 
and bought by higher 
concessions 
Only legal protection, 
no evidence of com-
pany-specific compro-
mises 
Instruments 
of flexibility 
Working time corridors 
and accounting 
schemes; use of tem-
porary agency work 
capped by works coun-
cils 
Working time corridors 
and accounting 
schemes; partially in-
tense use of temporary 
agency work 
No specific regulation; 
a lot of unpaid over-
time; temporary 
agency work of no im-
portance  
Incentive 
systems 
Highly individualised, 
only for non-pay 
scale/white collar em-
ployees; in one case 
target agreements for 
production teams in 
blue-collar area 
Individualised incen-
tives highly important 
for non-pay scale em-
ployees, the proportion 
of which increases 
 
No collective bargain-
ing and individual con-
tracts; investment in 
skill development 
Investment in 
skill devel-
opment 
Still high commitment 
to vocational training, 
this however increas-
ingly controversial 
Not yet investigated No investment in train-
ing, lack of vocational 
training institutions 
Exit options 
(outsourcing, 
off-shoring) 
Less outsourcing than 
in the 1990s, partially 
insourcing; increasing 
differentiation of work-
ing conditions in supply 
chains; off-shoring 
mainly for cost reasons 
(efficiency seeking 
FDI) 
Outsourcing continuing 
including total sell-off 
of business areas 
(BenQ case); strategic 
off-shoring to Eastern 
Europe, China 
Weak position of de-
veloping firms vis-à-vis 
publishers; publishers 
pass nearly all cost 
and flexibility pressures 
to developers; off-
shoring potential low 
for language/cultural 
reasons  
 
It is clear that the German model of labour regulation is under considerable pressure, 
even if this pressure and the resulting change dynamics vary considerably among 
industries. But do these changes represent a break with the “Modell Deutschland” or 
do they initiate a path-immanent adaptation to new conditions and problems? And 
what kind of a break would it be: 
– A decomposition of institutions and social compromises underlying the German 
work and employment model and a move towards the Anglo-American path of 
development? 
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– The creation of a new or a hybrid model successfully combining different institu-
tional elements? 
– A decomposition of institutions and social compromises that is not followed by 
the development of a new, consistent work and employment model. 
An important aspect in this regard could be the capability of the institutional frame-
work to deal with heterogeneity of requirements by different industry dynamics, i.e. 
with different requirements to labour markets, vocational training systems and gov-
ernance compromises in different industries. Is the “German model” too rigid to allow 
for heterogeneity or does its multi-layer system of collective bargaining allow for “a 
pragmatic strength of conflict and cooperation” which enables adaptation as Fichter 
points out (2005: 105)? Do not the changes of the collective bargaining system 
(opening clauses, company-level employment pacts) represent an example of the 
capability of collective actors in Germany to negotiate and regulate heterogeneity? 
This will be one of the questions for further research. 
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